

Peace talks + Resolutions

Drawer 10

Civil War

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The Civil War

Peace Talks and Resolutions

Excerpts from newspapers and other sources

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DAY, MARCH 1, 1861.

BY TELEGRAPH

TO THE

BOSTON DAILY EVENING TRANSCRIPT.

[SPECIAL DESPATCH TO THE TRANSCRIPT.]

THE SENATE ON THE PEACE PROPOSITIONS.

MR. SEWARD'S PLAN FAVORABLY CONSIDERED.

MR. LINCOLN'S CABINET.

OUTRAGES COMMITTED ON THE PRESIDENTIAL CARRIAGE.

WASHINGTON—Friday noon. Immense crowds are pouring into the Senate Chamber today, to hear the discussion on the propositions of the Peace Conference.

It is thought that the propositions of Mr. Corwin, which passed the House yesterday, and the recommendations of the Peace Conference, cannot command the necessary votes in the Senate to secure their adoption.

The resolutions of Senators Seward and Trumbull have many supporters in the Senate. They give an affirmative response to the wishes of the Legislatures of Kentucky, Illinois and New Jersey, in favor of a National Convention.

This plan proposes to amend or alter the Constitution of the United States, in the form and manner prescribed in the Constitution itself.

This measure, it is reported today, will command more votes in the Senate than those of the House of Representatives or the Peace Conference.

Mr. Lincoln will finally decide on his Cabinet tomorrow.

The elegant carriage presented to Mrs. Lincoln by the citizens of New York, arrived here by railroad today. It was much defaced by some malicious person, who has scratched the doors and otherwise injured the beautiful work on the vehicle.

On account of the state of public affairs, the Inaugural Address of President Lincoln will not be sent from Washington in advance of its delivery.

[TO THE ASSOCIATED PRESS.]

PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTACK ON FORT SUMTER.

MR. LINCOLN SERENADED.

GOV. HOUSTON IMPLICATED IN THE TWIGGS TREACHERY.

THE MISSOURI CONVENTION.

Washington, 1st. Despatches received from Major Anderson say that the work continues on the Bombproof Battery at Cummings Point, but that he could with the guns of Fort Sumter sweep all away in a few moments.

John Bell denies that he has been offered a seat in the Cabinet, or that he desires one.

Captain Pope, of the Army, one of Lincoln's travelling suite, has been court-martialled for speaking disrespectfully of Mr. Buchanan in a recent lecture at Cincinnati.

Mr. Lincoln dined yesterday with Mr. Spaulding, member of Congress from the Buffalo district, in company with General Scott, Messrs. Seward, Bates, Chase and others.

A court-martial has been ordered in the case of Captain Armstrong for surrendering the Pensacola Navy Yard.

Advices from Charleston state that the floating Battery was launched on Monday last. Dahlgreen guns were hourly expected. All the troops on furlough are ordered to return by Wednesday.

Lincoln, Hamlin and Corwin were serenaded last evening by the Marine Band. Mr. Lincoln responded to the compliment as follows:

My Friends—I suppose I may take this as a compliment paid to me, and as such please accept my thanks. I have reached the city of Washington under circumstances considerably different from those under which any other man reached it. I have reached it for the purpose of taking an official position among its people, almost all of whom were opposed to me, and are yet opposed to me, as I suppose. (Cries of "No, no.")

I propose no lengthy address to you now. I only propose to say, as I said yesterday, when your worthy board of Aldermen called on me, that I believe much ill feeling exists between you and the people of your surroundings, and that people from amongst whom I came. I have depended and now depend upon the removal of all misunderstanding. I hope that things shall go along as prosperously as I believe you desire they may. I may have it in my power to remove something of this misunderstanding, and I may be able to convince you and the people of your section of the country at large, that we regard you in all things, as being our equals, and entitled to the same respect and the same treatment as ourselves.

We are in no wise disposed, if it were in our power, to offend you, or to deprive you of any of your rights under the Constitution, or even narrowly to split hairs with you in regard to what are your rights, but to give you so far as in our power all your rights under the Constitution, not grudgingly, but fully and fairly, and I hope, that by thus talking with you we will become better acquainted, and I trust in the future we will become better friends. Now, my friends, with these very few remarks I return you my thanks for this compliment, and expressing my desire to hear a little more good music, I bid you good night.

Washington, 28th. Mrs. Lincoln visited Miss Lane yesterday, at the White House.

It is reported that correspondence exists in the War Department showing that Governor Houston was greatly instrumental in inducing Twiggs to surrender the government property in Texas.

St. Louis, 28th. The Convention assembled today in Jefferson City. It was called to order by Judge Orr, and was temporarily organized by the choice of Judge Gamble for President. Committees on credentials and a permanent organization were appointed, when it was found that only seventy-five members were present. Adjourned until tomorrow.

After a permanent organization the Convention will adjourn to St. Louis. The news from Washington had a pleasant effect upon the members. Ex-Governor Price will probably be permanent President.

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THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS AND THE PRESIDENT.

THE CORRESPONDENCE PUBLISHED.

NEW YORK, 7th.

The correspondence between the South Carolina Commissioners and the President is printed in the Charleston papers of the 5th, received here by the steamer *Columbia* tonight. The Commissioner's first letter sets forth that they have full powers to treat for the delivery of the forts and other public property, and also for the apportionment of the public debt and division of the public property and for the continuance of peace. They were furnished with an official copy of the secession ordinance, and were prepared to negotiate on the basis of that ordinance, but the action of Major Anderson altered the condition of affairs under which they came and they urged the President to immediately withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, as such a standing menace rendered negotiations impossible. The letter is signed by Barnwell, Adams and Orr.

In reply, the President reiterates what he said in his message, and says that he can meet them only as private gentlemen, but is willing to communicate to Congress any proposition they might make. In reply to the assertion of the Commissioners that he was pledged not to alter the status of the forces at Charleston, the President transmits to them the copy of a note from the Representatives of South Carolina expressing a belief that neither the State or the people of South Carolina would molest the forts until offers were made to amicably arrange the difficulties, provided the military status remained undisturbed. The President says he objected to the word "provided," as it might be construed into an agreement which he never would make, but was assured that such a construction would not be put upon it. It was his determination not to reinforce the forts until they were actually attacked, or he had certain information that they would be. He had never sent reinforcements, and certainly never authorized any change in their relative military status.

He refers the Commissioners to the order of the Secretary of War of the 11th to Major Anderson to avoid acts that would tend to provoke aggression, and not to take any position that could be construed into a hostile attitude, but to hold possession of the forts in the harbor, and if attacked to defend them to the last extremity. The smallness of Major Anderson's force not permitting him to occupy more than one fort, in case of attack, was permitted to take possession of either. The President further says it is clear that Major Anderson acted without authority, unless he had evidence of hostilities, and justice requires that the brave officer should not be condemned without a hearing. His (the President's) first prompting was to order Major Anderson back to Fort Moultrie, but information that the Palmetto flag floated over Forts Moultrie and Pinckney precluded his taking this step.

He recounts the seizure of the forts, the hoisting of Palmetto flags over the Post office and Custom House, where the American flag should be, and the resignation of Federal officers, and says under such circumstances he was urged to withdraw the Federal troops from Charleston. This he could not do, and would not do. Such an idea could never be entertained in any possible contingency. He then states that he had just received a despatch stating that the Arsenal at Charleston had been seized, containing over half a million of property belonging to the government. Comment he says, is needless, and he will only add that while it is his duty to defend Fort Sumter against hostile attacks from whatever quarter, he cannot perceive how such defense can be construed into a menace against Charleston.

The Commissioners, in reply, say that they are perfectly content with their reception, and enter into no animadversions as to the quotations made by the President from their letter. They state that his action in removing a veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie because he wished for an additional supply of ammunition, his accepting of the resignation of a cabinet officer, and other acts, led the people of South Carolina to believe that he would keep the pledge implied in the note of the representatives from that State. They say that the President seeks to escape from his obligations, and that his prompt decision on the day after their arrival would have avoided subsequent complications.

They contend that the procedure of Maj. Anderson was an act of war, and that the subsequent action of the State was to secure defense. They say to the President: "You have decided—you have resolved to hold by force what was obtained by misplaced confidence, and converted Major Anderson's violation of orders into a legitimate executive order. You have rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force the issue upon South Carolina she will accept it, relying upon Him who is the God of justice as well as the God of hosts, and she will endeavor to do her duty bravely and hopefully."

The following is the reply of the President:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION. This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it."

1861

THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

RESTORATION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DEMANDED OF LOUISIANA.

INTELLIGENCE FROM MAJOR ANDERSON.

Mr. Lincoln to Give his Views on Compromises.

New York, Feb. 26th. Washington special dispatches state that the resolution offered by Mr. Somes of Maine in the Peace Conference, to protect free speech and freedom of the press in the Territories, was rejected by a small majority.

It is understood that the administration intends to institute proceedings immediately in the Twiggs treason case.

Mr. Boutwell and other New Englanders urge the appointment of N. P. Banks as Secretary of War.

Caleb Cushing has given his opinion, by request, on the legality of Floyd's acceptances. He holds that the Government is liable.

Secretary Holt addressed a letter to the Governor of Louisiana demanding the restoration of the Government property in New Orleans, denouncing it as a flagrant and atrocious spoliation. Gov. Moore has returned the letter endorsed—"When addressed in the usual language of official intercourse, he would consider the matter."

President Davis has appointed Yancey Commissioner to Europe.

There was a warm election in Georgetown yesterday. An anti-Democratic Mayor was chosen.

Major Anderson writes that no unusual preparations have recently been made against him, and some works are apparently abandoned.

Secretary Floyd recently boasted that so distributed was the army, that no considerable force could be collected against the secessionists under two months.

The Times says that several prominent Republicans of the Peace Conference consulted with Mr. Lincoln, and propounded certain questions, which he expressed the determination to answer in writing. Should this prove true, the question of compromise will soon be determined.

1861

A LEAF FROM HISTORY

THE "PEACE RESOLUTIONS" IN THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE IN 1863.

Desperate Attempts of the Fire-in-the-Rear Fellows to Make the War a Still War—The Men Who Voted For an Agid against the Resolutions in the House—How Alfrey Were Throttled in the Senate.

Some one who has been resurrecting history sends THE TRIBUNE, somewhat worn and yellowish copy of the *Marquette Weekly Express*, dated Montello, Wis., Friday, March 6, 1863, containing, among other things, an ardent editorial advocating the calling of a National Convention for the purpose of attempting to settle the War by arbitration. The editor is backed up by a series of resolutions, published on the same page, which had just been adopted by one branch of the Illinois General Assembly. Commenting on them, the Wisconsin editor said: "Read them carefully, and view them as coming from the Legislature of Lincoln's own State. The work has already commenced, let it go forward, and its importance possess the mind of every intelligent thinking patriot of the Northern free States."

ORIGIN AND DATE OF THE RESOLUTIONS.

The resolutions referred to, which were known as the "Illinois Peace Resolutions of 1863," originated in the House, having been conceived in the powerful brain of that ardent fire-in-the-rear patriot, the Hon. V. W. O'Brien, then hailing from Peoria. They were reported to the House from the Committee on Federal Relations of which Scott Wike—an ardent Pike County Democrat and subsequently a member of Congress—was Chairman. Though they passed the House Feb. 12, 1863, by a vote of 52 to 28, they shared a very different fate in the Senate. After much acrimonious debate and frequent postponements, the Republicans, once absenting themselves and breaking the quorum, they were set as a special order. In the meantime, however, the Democrats lost a member by sudden death, in the person of Senator Rogers of Clinton. This left the Senate a tie, with the presiding officer, Lieut.-Gov. Hoffman, who had the casting vote in such contingency, against the Democrats. Thus, the resolutions failed in the Senate and went over to the June session, when Gov. Yates prorogued thus hanging them up for all time. The resolutions were as follows:

PEACE WHEN THERE IS NO PEACE.

WHEREAS, The Union has no existence separate from the Federal Constitution; but, being created solely by that instrument, it can only exist virtue therefore; and when the provisions of the Constitution are suspended, either in time of war or in peace, whether by the North or the South, is alike disunion; and

WHEREAS, The Federal Government can lawfully exercise a power that is not conferred upon by the Federal Constitution; the exercise, therefore, of other powers not granted by the instrument, in time of war as well as in time of peace, a violation of the written will of the American people, destructive of their form of government and of their common liberties; and

WHEREAS, The Constitution cannot be made to public feeling, by the mere exercise of the coercive powers conceded to the General Government, and that, in case of differences and conflicts between the State and Federal Governments too powerful for adjustment by the civil department of the Government, the appeal is not to the sword by the State or by the General Government, but to the people, peacefully assembled by their representatives in convention; and

WHEREAS, The allegiance of the citizen is due alone to the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof—not to any man, or officer, or Administration; and whatever support is due to any officer of this Government is due alone by virtue of the Constitution and the laws; and

WHEREAS, Also, the condition of the whole Republic, but more especially the preservation of the liberties of the people of Illinois, imperatively demands that we, their representatives, should make known to our fellow-countrymen our deliberate judgment and will:

We do therefore declare, That the act of the Federal Administration in suspending the writ of habeas corpus, the arrest of citizens not subject to military law, without warrant or authority; transporting them to distant States, incarcерating them in political prisons without charge or accusation, denying them the right of trial by jury, witnesses in their favor, or counsel for their defense; withholding from them all knowledge of their accusers and the cause of their arrest; answering their petitions for redress by repeated injury and insult; prescribing in many cases, as a condition of their release, test oaths, arbitrary and illegal; in the abridgment

of freedom of speech and of the press, by imprisoning the citizen for expressing his sentiments; by suppressing newspapers by military force, and establishing a censorship over others, wholly incompatible with freedom of thought and expression of opinion; and the establishment of a system of espionage by a secret police to invade the sacred privacy of unsuspecting citizens; declaring martial law over States not in rebellion, and when the courts are open and unobstructed for the punishment of crime; in declaring the slaves of loyal as well as disloyal citizens in certain States and parts of States free; the attempted enforcement of compensated emancipation; the proposed taxation of the laboring white man to purchase the freedom and secure the elevation of the negro; the transportation of negroes into the State of Illinois in defiance of the repeatedly expressed will of the people; the arrest and imprisonment of the representatives of a free and sovereign State; the dismemberment of the State of Virginia, erecting within her boundaries a new State, without the consent of her Legislature—are, each and all, arbitrary and unconstitutional, a usurpation of the legislative functions, and a suspension of the judicial department of the State and Federal Governments, subverting the Constitution, State and Federal, invading the reserved rights of the people and the sovereignty of the States, and, if sanctioned, destructive of the Union, establishing, upon the common ruins of the liberties of the people and the sovereignty of the States, a consolidated military despotism.

And we hereby solemnly declare that no American citizen can, without the crime of infidelity to his country's Constitution and the allegiance which he bears to each, sanction such usurpations. Believing that our silence will be criminal, and may be construed into consent, in deep reverence for our Constitution, which has been ruthlessly violated, we do hereby enter our most solemn protest against these usurpations of power, and place the same before the world, intending thereby to warn our public servants against further usurpations; therefore

Resolved, by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring herein), That the army was organized, confiding in the declaration of the President in his inaugural address—to-wit: that he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it existed, and that he believed he had no lawful right to do so, and that he had no inclination to do so; and upon the declaration of the Federal Congress—to-wit: that this war is not waged in any spirit of oppression or subjugation, or any purpose of overthrowing any of the institutions of any of the States; and that inasmuch as the whole policy of the Administration since the organization of the army has been at war with the declarations aforesaid, culminating in the emancipation proclamation, leaving the fact patent that the War has been diverted from its first avowed object to that of subjugation and the abolition of slavery, a fraud, both legal and moral, has been perpetrated upon the brave sons of Illinois, who have so nobly gone forth to battle for the Constitution and the laws; and, while we protest against the continuance of this gross fraud upon our citizen soldiers, we thank them for that heroic conduct on the battlefield that sheds imperishable glory on the State of Illinois.

Resolved, That we believe the further prosecution of the present War cannot result in the restoration of the Union and the preservation of the Constitution as our fathers made it unless the President's emancipation proclamation be withdrawn.

Resolved, That, while we condemn and denounce the flagrant and monstrous usurpations of the Administration and encroachments of Abolitionism, we equally condemn and denounce the ruinous heresy of Secession as unwarranted by the Constitution and destructive alike of the security and perpetuity of our Government and the peace and liberty of the people; and fearing, as we do, that it is the intention of the present Congress and Administration at no distant day to acknowledge the independence of the Southern Confederacy and thereby sever the Union, we hereby solemnly declare that we are unalterably opposed to any such severance of the Union, and that we never can consent that the great Northwest shall be separated from the Southern States comprising the Mississippi Valley. That river shall never water the soil of two nations, but, from its source to its confluence with the gulf, shall belong to one great and united people.

Resolved, That peace, fraternal relations, and political fellowship should be restored among the States; that the best interests of all and the welfare of man required that this should be done in the most speedy and most effective manner; that it is to the people we must look for a restoration of the Union and the blessings of peace, and to these ends we shall direct our earnest and honest efforts; and hence we are in favor of the assembling of a National convention of all the States to so adjust our National difficulties that the States may hereafter live in harmony, each being secured in the rights guaranteed respectively to all by our fathers; and which convention we recommend, shall convene at Louisville, Ky., or such other place as shall be determined upon by Congress or the several States at the earliest practicable period.

Resolved, further, therefore, That, to rehury the object of the foregoing resolutions, we hereby memorialize the Congress of the United States, the Administration at Washington, and the Executives and Legislatures of the several States, to take such immediate action as shall secure an armistice in which the rights and safety of the Government shall be fully protected for such length of time as may be necessary to enable the people to meet in convention aforesaid; and we therefore earnestly recommend to our fellow-citizens everywhere to observe and keep all their laws (and constitutional)

obligations, to abstain from all violence, and to meet together and reason each with the other upon the best mode to attain the great blessing of peace, unity, and liberty; and be it further

Resolved, That, to secure the cooperation of the States and the General Government, Stephen T. Logan, Samuel S. Marshall, H. K. S. O'Malley,

William C. Gandy, Anthony Thornton, and John D. Caton are hereby appointed Commissioners to confer immediately with Congress and the President of the United States, and with the Legislatures and Executives of the several States, and urge the necessity of prompt action to secure said armistice, and the election of delegates to an early assembling of said convention, and to arrange and agree with the General Government and the several States upon the time and place of holding said convention, and that they report their action in the premises to the General Assembly of this State.

Resolved, That the Speaker of the House of Representatives be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to the President of the United States, to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and to each of the Governors and Speakers of the House of Representatives of the several States.

"PEACE" MEN.

Those in the House voting in the affirmative on these resolutions were:

Names.	County.
Charles E. Boyer.....	Will
Michael Brandt.....	Cook
William J. Brown.....	Adams
Albert G. Burr.....	Scott
John S. Busey.....	Champaign
Thomas B. Cabeen.....	Mercer
Gustavus F. Coffeen.....	Montgomery
Chauncey L. Conger.....	White
Philander Dougherty.....	Clark
Jefferson A. Davis.....	Woodford
John O. Dent.....	La Salle
George Dent.....	Putnam
John M. English.....	Jersey
James M. Epler.....	Cass
Melville W. Fuller.....	Cook
John Gerrard.....	Edgar
Theodore C. Gibson.....	La Salle
John G. Grubham.....	Fulton
James M. Heard.....	Wayne
Thomas B. Hicks.....	Mossac
James Holgate.....	Stark
Charles A. Keyes.....	Sangamon
John Kistler.....	Rock Island
Robert H. McCann.....	Fayette
Edmund Menard.....	Randolph
John W. Merritt.....	Marion
Ambrose M. Miller.....	Logan
John Monroe.....	Vernon
Milton Morrill.....	Hancock
W. W. O'Brien.....	Peoria
David W. Odell.....	Crawford
Marcy B. Patty.....	Livingston
Henry R. Peffer.....	Warren
Lewis J. Reid.....	McDonough
Reuben Roessler.....	Shelby
Joseph Sharon.....	Schuylerville
James W. Sharpe.....	Wabash
Simeon P. Slope.....	Fulton
James H. Smith.....	Unien
John T. Springer.....	Morgan
John Ten Brook.....	Coles
James B. Turner.....	Gallatin
Charles A. Walker.....	Macoupin
James M. Washburn.....	Williamson
William Watkins.....	Bond
Elies Wenger.....	Tazewell
John W. Wescott.....	Clay
Alexander E. Wheat.....	Adams
Scott Wike.....	Pike
Henry M. Williams.....	Jefferson
William B. Witt.....	Green
Mr. Speaker, Samuel A. Buckmaster.....	Madison
Total, 52.	

FOR THE WAR.

Those voting in the negative were:

Name.	County.
Algernon S. Barnard.....	Du Page
Jacob P. Beach.....	Kendall
Lorenzo Brentano.....	Cook
H. C. Burchard.....	Stephenson
Joseph F. Chapman.....	Carroll
Selden M. Church.....	Winnebago
Ansel B. Cook.....	Cook
Francis A. Eastman.....	Cook
James Elder.....	Macon
James V. Gale.....	Ogle
William E. Ginter.....	Cook
Addison Goodell.....	Iroquois
Henry Green.....	Jo Daviess
E. M. Haines.....	Lake
Demas L. Harris.....	Lee
James Helyoke.....	Knox
Chauncey L. Lake.....	Kankakee
Luther W. Lawrence.....	Boone
Sylvester S. Mann.....	Kane
John W. Newport.....	Grundy
Harrison Noble.....	McLean
Writell W. Sedgwick.....	De Kalb
Leander Smith.....	Whiteside
Boynton Tenny.....	De Witt
John Thomas.....	St. Clair
Amos G. Throop.....	Cook
Joseph B. Underwood.....	St. Clair
Thaddeus B. Wakeman.....	McHenry
Total, 28.	

REVERDY JOHNSON ON THE PEACE CONGRESS.

We copy below, from the *Journal of Commerce*, an important letter, from Hon. REVERDY JOHNSON, respecting the doings of the Peace Congress, held at Washington in the winter of 1861, of which Mr. JOHNSON was a prominent member:

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1863.

Eds. Journal of Commerce:

I am obliged to you for the copy of Mr. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD'S letter to you, of the 21st of April last, published in your paper of the succeeding day. In the present condition of the country no advantage perhaps can be gained by recalling "the history of the Peace Convention," but as Mr. F. has thought fit to do so, it is proper that the fact which he states in regard to it if erroneous should be corrected. As one of the members named by him, as having been satisfied with "the peace conference," I avail myself of the first leisure to give the fact as it was. This will be done with no view to call in question the purposed accuracy of Mr. FIELD, but to set myself right with those who may feel an interest in the subject. For this purpose a few preliminary remarks are necessary. The Convention assembled, at the instance of Virginia, through resolutions passed by her General Assembly, on the 19th of January, 1861. Their preamble sets forth as "the deliberate opinion" of that body that "unless the unhappy controversy which so divides the States of the confederacy shall be satisfactorily adjusted a permanent dissolution of the Union is inevitable."

In this conviction the most, if not all of the Southern States were believed to concur, and also very many of the discerning and reflecting citizens of the Northern States. Evidence of this was found in the debates in Congress, discussions on the hustings, in the public press, and in many of the pulpits of the country. However unjustifiable as things then were (if the desired adjustment was not obtained) a severance of the Union by force would be esteemed by the intelligent patriotism of the country, it was yet manifest from their antecedents, that there were men, North and South, who looked to such a result, not only without regret, but with hope and gladness. They were doubtless few in each section, but they were zealous, reckless, and fanatical, and needed only, to succeed, topics with which to delude andadden the mind of the honest masses around them. These, all good loyal men, were solicitous to deprive them of, and hence they were most anxious to place *slavery*, the chief cause of mischief, beyond their reach. That the danger existed, not only manifested itself in the manner before stated, but every proposition offered in the peace convention, whether by Northern or Southern delegates, disclosed it.

1st. The nature of the seven amendments to the Constitution, reported by a majority of the Committee of which Mr. GUTHRIE was chairman, implied it.

2d. The minority report by Mr. BALDWIN, of Connecticut, in terms almost, stated it. The preamble of resolutions recommended by him said, "Whereas, unhappy differences exist which have alienated from each other portions of the people of the United States to such an extent as seriously to disturb the peace of the nation."

The principle of legal nullification, asserted by Mr. CALHOUN in 1828, in a carefully prepared paper which was made the foundation of the nullifying ordinance of his State, of 1832, was maintained in part, if not mainly, on the authority of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798-9. The folly of the doctrine, its utter inconsistency with the very words and objects of the Constitution, were so obvious that neither the intellectual

acute as th which its author supported it, nor the influence of his previously well earned fame, nor the persuasive authority of the great names of JEFFERSON and MADISON, could save it from almost universal condemnation in every State except that of its origin, and from the condemnation of the purest, brigadier, and ablest minds of South Carolina he self. One of these, JAMES L. PETTIGREW, but recently taken from us, to the deep regret of the nation, undismayed by the intense treason and frantic violence around him, safe from their danger by the shield of his spotless character, his stern courage and lofty patriotism to the very last of his stay on earth, retained and boldly avowed his perfect loyalty to the government. Too wise to be led astray by the shallow fallacies of the KNTS and YANCEYS of the hour, and too devoted to the happiness of his State and country, to take any other course, he clung to the faith of our fathers, and boldly denounced the treason to which these conspirators invited, and by which they have, to their ruin, led their deluded followers.

The doctrine therefore soon fell into general disrepute, and was finally, and to the gratification of the country, extinguished by the matchless power and eloquence of WEBSTER, and the stern patriotism and indomitable will of JACKSON. It was demonstrated by Mr. MADISON himself, whose mind remained as clear as sunlight, in several letters in 1831-2, to be utterly untenable, and with no warrant either in the resolutions of '98 or, in the report, the work of his pen, made in defense of those of Virginia. This heresy exploded, the other kindred and as gross and more pernicious one of Secession was substituted. But this at first met with little favor. In fact it slept unheeded. A portion however of its votaries designed at the first opportunity to make it work certain mischief, and for mischief only was it suited. The taill no longer furnishing this opportunity, the plan was "to fire the Southern heart," and drive the Southern mind to madness by slavery agitation. The institution was so connected with their domestic comfort and so vital, as they thought, to their material wealth—was of such long and undisturbed standing, and so clearly recognized and protected by the constitution itself, and had not only been the cause of danger, but the source as they believed of their prosperity and political power, and above all, its sudden termination would in their judgment, be so fruitful of even the direst calamities, that to approach it with that end, was sure to produce the sternest determination to resist the effort at all hazards, and to break, if it could not be otherwise successfully accomplished, even the ties of association of fraternal affection and of love of country, which, until then, had been a universal national sentiment and a fountain of national power. The plotters on both sides, who had long wished and meditated a destruction of the Union for that purpose, eagerly caught at every chance to present and fan into flame this fruitful topic of mischief. With that view those in the South greatly exaggerated the prevalence of Northern hostility, whilst those in the North did all they could to aid them. Whether by arrangement or not, they were in fact the allies of each other. They worked for the same end and by the same means—*slavery agitation*. It was the conduct of these comparatively few men, that brought the country to the condition in which it was generally believed to be when the peace convention assembled, a condition which it was thought would terminate, if not satisfactorily settled, as solemnly declared in the resolutions under which the convention assembled, "in a permanent dissolution of the Union." The conservative members of the convention reflecting as I then believed, and now believe, the sincere wish of a large majority of the people of every State represented, earnestly desired to satisfy the South

that the institution would not be interfered with, and on the contrary, that their rights in relation to it would be faithfully observed in the present and securely protected in the future. With this object they wished to give the South, without impairing any rights vested in the North, such guarantees, which, although implied as they taught, in the constitution as it is, would, if given in terms quiet the Southern mind and deprive the treasonable agitators North and South of the only subjects on which they could hope to make themselves what they were evidently about to be, the arch-
tects of their country's ruin.

To accomplish this, however, as the Convention possessed but a moral power, it was obvious that *unanimity of opinion was vital*. Recommendations by a bare majority, it was almost hopeless to believe, could produce a happy result. In the Committee, to whom the whole subject was referred, and at whose head was placed Mr. GUTHRIE, of Kentucky, and of which Mr. FIELD was a member, efforts to this end were made again and again, but in vain. And what was finally agreed upon and reported, met with the sanction of but a bare majority of the Committee, Mr. FIELD not being one of that majority. The discussions, in every meeting of the Committee, were earnest, and a part of the Southern members (I was of the number) implored their Northern brethren to agree to something that there was any reason to believe would be satisfactory to the South. I saw then that unanimity could alone render the propositions of the Committee effective. I also saw, and, as the result has proved, that no satisfactory adjustment attained, an attempt at least would be made to sever the Union. Not that I believe for a moment that such an attempt could find any warrant in the Constitution, or be justly maintained on revolutionary grounds, and still less, that if timely and vigorously met, it could be successful. But I believed that the long plotting traitors would succeed in misleading the honest masses, and in driving them on to destruction, through the madness and wickedness of treasonable rebellion, by filling them with a conviction that the institution of slavery would be assailed, and all the fatal consequences which they apprehended from it ensue. All the Southerners and many of the Northern members of the Convention thought that satisfactory guarantees should be offered the South, and that to make the recommendations of the Convention effective, the proposition should receive unanimous support. That done, we were convinced that the South would see that their enemies in the North constituted but a small portion of its people, possessing no power to be dreaded, and that public opinion there was sound, and desired to secure the South in all its rights, and in protecting them against the wrongs and perils with which they were threatened. In this view many of the Northern delegates concurred. Of those from New York, all concurred, but a bare majority, Mr. FIELD being, I regret to say, one of that majority. He, and they who acted with him, advocated Mr. BALDWIN'S proposal for a National Convention. In vain were they told by every Southern member that such a proposition would be insufficient for the crisis—that it would practically have no healing effect whatever, but on the contrary, would, under the circumstances, be esteemed mere trifling. In the then temper of the States, they were also told, what seemed to us to be obvious, that it was more than doubtful whether such a convention could be constitutionally procured, and certain, if it was had, that no guarantees that the South would consider sufficient would be recommended. Had the N. Y. delegates adopted a different course—had they spoken with one voice in support of the Guthrie report (so justly popular as that voice ever is), I believed then, and believe now, that the desired unanimity in support of the

report could have been obtained, and that Congress would have acted upon it at its then session, or if not, that the South would have felt such an assurance of security in the recommendation of the convention, that no immediate attempt at rebellion would have been made.

But, from a want of foresight, as I think—from a blindness to the danger that was before them—that voice was not spoken. The majority of her delegates, so far from speaking it, resolved on an opposite course, and were active and most influential in defeating the so much desired, the so vital unanimity, in support of any guarantees that the Southern members and many of the Northern members thought would alone meet the crisis. Their mistake (and a dreadful one it was) was because, perhaps without being aware of it, they were under party rather than national influences. They were too, it seemed to me, under the further and as sad error of believing that the South was not in earnest; and that from fear, or other motive, they would not venture on rebellion. They maintained throughout, their opposition to the proposed Guthrie guarantees, and were equally hostile to any that their Southern brethren over and over again offered; and in terms of earnest invocation implored them, adopting solicitation that would have been esteemed, and truly, undignified, but for the great issue that they felt to be impending—CIVIL WAR;—a war between brothers—a war that would sunder ties the holiest that had ever bound people together—a war to be attended with dreadful misery—the destruction of our prosperity for untold ages—the loss of our proud station amongst the nations of the world, and probably the total extinguishment for years, if not forever, of our very freedom itself.

But entreaty proved as fruitless as argument. The resolutions containing the guarantees passed the Convention, but only by a mere majority, and, as foreseen, they resulted in nothing. They were not acted upon by Congress. They imparted not even temporary assurance of safety to the anxious South; and now the so much dreaded civil war is upon us. Oh! that its existence, its frightful progress, its millions of wasted wealth, its effect upon our national reputation, and above all, the agony which it has brought into thousands and thousands of before happy households—could then have been foreseen by Mr. FIELD, and those who concurred with him! Any honorable, satisfactory guarantee, if then offered—guarantees that would in no particular have surrendered or impaired the rights of the North—would, I doubt not, have been received with joyous acclamation; and we should still be, as we were once, a united, and therefore a happy, prosperous and powerful people—able to hear, with naught but contemptuous pity, the insolence and vulgar scurility of the English ROEBUCKS of the day, whose former professed and hypocritical hatred of slavery they are now yielding to the base love of avaricious gain, too strong not only for all moral restraint, but even for the restraint of their own penal laws. Let us not, however, for a moment permit ourselves to believe that such men are types of the English character, or speak English opinion. Fortunately for her honor, her interest and her safety, and her influence upon the civilization and freedom of Europe, they are as unlike the gentlemen and statesmen of that great country, as our peculators and blockade runners are unlike our honest and loyal citizens. They are, in truth, themselves but the *upstarts* of the kingdom if, as is justly remarked by one of their most esteemed and gifted historic writers, “arrogance and presumption be the usual faults” of the class.

From what I have said, you will see that Mr. FIELD is totally mistaken in supposing that the Peace Conference ~~safely~~ ^{fixed} me, or, as I have every reason to know, satisfied either of the other members named by him. The guarantees recommended in Mr. GUTHRIE's report were satisfied by the conduct of the Convention, resulting in a great measure from Mr. FIELD's course, rendered the Convention itself anything but satisfactory. We saw in it, as the result proved, certain defeat in Congress of the recommended guarantees, and saw, with equal clearness, that the result of its deliberations would not, for a moment, suspend even the perilous excitement of the Southern mind, or avert the calamity it involved. But the errors of the past cannot be corrected. We can only learn from them wisdom for the future. What does that teach us? Is it, that no Union feeling is now to be found in the Southern States? Is it that it is so totally extinct that to revive it is impossible? I do not think so. The GUTHRIES and WICKLIFFES, the JONESSES, the RODNEYS and the BATES, the RIVES and the SUMMERS, the RUFFINS and the MORRISSEANS, and the thousands and thousands who united with them still live in their hearts, as pure as ever, love of the Union which their fathers constructed. Satisfy them that, the war ended, that Union will be as it was intended to be, and was before treason and fanaticism involved us in the existing frightful struggle, and much, very much, will be done to bring the struggle to an end, and to restore our former nationality. We shall then, too, know each other the better, and value each other the more. Courage has been found a common possession—mistakes as to character corrected—love of freedom is seen to be equally sincere, and we shall be more firmly convinced than we have ever been that Union, under all the guarantees of personal and State rights which our fathers provided, can alone make us what they intended and believed they had accomplished through their blood and wisdom—the freest and the happiest, and one of the most influential nations of the world.

With great regard,
Your obd't s'rvt,
REVERDY JOHNSON.

FROM THE REBEL CAPITAL.

The Jaques and Gilmore Mission to Davis
Report of Secretary Benjamin—Comments
of the Examiner—What sort of
Armistice will end the Rebels.

From Richmond Examiner Aug. 26.

As usual Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State, has placed the country in a mean, base and humiliating position. Having nothing on earth to do in the way of the legitimate business of his office, he spends his activity in pushing himself into eternal scrapes, which, indeed, would be of little consequence if they affected him alone. Unfortunately, however, owing to the public office which he (nominally) holds, his stupid blunders touch us all rather closely. We find now the Secretary of State of the Confederate States engaged in a newfangled adventure with the spies, who lately sneaked into Richmond; and who come, as one of them affirms, armed with a letter of introduction to our Secretary of State from a Mr. —. The spy does not tell the name of the Yankee who introduced him; but we should greatly desire to know what Yankee can commission a spy into our lines, and assure to him handsome treatment, and access to the President and public offices, by a letter to Mr. Benjamin. The statement of this fact causes us an unpleasant sensation.

Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do; and our Secretary of State, having no State affairs to attend to, naturally, by way of relaxation, falls easily into communication with any sort of scoundrels who have due to talk to him; especially such as are introduced by a letter from his nameless Yankee friend, Mr. —. No wonder he finds, shortly afterwards, that the profligate Yankees have made up a bundle of falsehoods to suit the taste of their fellow-countrymen at home; and thus we have the edifying spectacle of the Confederate Secretary of State entering into a controversy with those spies in the public journals about the facts which they report. It is too late: he received them graciously, on the introduction of his friend, Mr. —; procured them an interview with the President; and they are now making capital of their adventure in the way of magazine articles and lectures at twenty-five cents per head. He cannot now invalidate the accuracy of the information which these spies have carried North by alleging "the extreme inaccuracy of Mr. Gilmore's narrative."

Perhaps the most absurd thing in all this business is the manner in which Mr. Benjamin has addressed his long refutation of the spies—"To Hon James M. Mason, Commissioner to the Continent, &c., &c., et cetera." Mr. Mason is not a Commissioner to any continent; Mr. Mason has never read, and never will read, in all probability, either the narratives of the spies, or Mr. Benjamin's refutation thereof. Why does not Mr. Benjamin send a communication to the newspapers at once, and scathe and scorch and scold those spies to the best of his ability? If anything can aggravate the provocation of seeing a Cabinet Minister of the Confederate States engaged in such an altercation at all, it is to see him put on such preposterous diplomatic airs, turning a paragraph into a protocol.

THE SO-CALLED "PEACE-MISSION" TO RICHMOND— THE TRUE HISTORY OF THE AFFAIR.

CIRCULAR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Richmond, Aug. 25, 1864.

Sir—Numerous publications which have recently appeared in the journals of the United States, on the subject of informal overtures for peace between the two Federations of States now at war on this continent, render it desirable that you should be fully advised of the views and policy of this Government on a matter of such paramount importance. It is likewise proper that you should be accurately informed of what has occurred on the several occasions mentioned in the published statements.

You have heretofore been furnished with copies of the manifesto issued by the Congress of the Confederate States with the approval of the President, on the 14th June last, and have doubtless acted in conformity with the resolution which requested that copies of this manifesto should be laid before foreign Governments. "The principal sentiments and purposes by which these States have been and are still actuated," are set forth in that paper with all the authority due to the solemn declaration of the Legislative and Executive Departments of this Government, and with a clearness which leaves no room for comment or explanation. In a few sentences it is pointed out that all we ask is immunity from interference with our internal peace and prosperity, "and to be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of those inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which our common ancestors declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to the social compact. Let them forbear egressions upon us, and the war is at an end. If there be questions which require adjustment by negotiation, we have ever been willing and are still willing to enter into communication with our adversaries, in a spirit of peace, of equity and manly frankness." The manifesto closed with the declaration that "we commit our cause to the enlightened judgment of the world, to the sober reflections of our adversaries themselves, and to the solemn and righteous arbitrament of heaven."

Within a very few weeks after the publication of this manifesto, it seemed to have met with a response from President Lincoln. In the early part of last month a letter was received by Gen. Lee from Lieut. Gen. Grant, in the following words:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"CITY POINT, VA., July 8, 1864.

"Gen. R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate forces near Petersburg, Virginia:

"GENERAL: I would request that Col. James F. Jaques, Seventy third Illinois Volunteer Infantry, and J. R. Gilmore, esq., be allowed to meet Col. Robert Ould, Commissioner for the Exchange of Prisoners, at such place between the lines of the two armies as you

may designate. The object of the meeting is to settle the duties of Col. Ould, as Commissioner.

"If not consistent for you to grant the request here asked, I would beg that this be referred to President Davis for his action.

"Requesting me early an answer to this communication as you may find it convenient to make, I subscribe myself, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-Gen. U.S.A."

On the reference of this letter to the President he authorized Colonel Ould to meet the persons named in General Grant's letter, and Colonel Ould, after seeing them, returned to Richmond and reported to the President, in the presence of the Secretary of War and myself, that Messrs. Jaques and Gilmore had not said anything to him about their duties as Commissioners for exchange of prisoners, but that they asked permission to come to Richmond for the purpose of seeing the President; that they came with the knowledge and approval of President Lincoln, and under his pass; that they were informal messengers sent with a view of paving the way for a meeting of formal Commissioners authorized to negotiate for peace, and desired to communicate to President Davis the views of Mr. Lincoln, and to obtain the President's views in return, as to arrange for a meeting of Commissioners. Colonel Ould stated that he had told them repeatedly that it was useless to come to Richmond to talk of peace on any other terms than the recognized independence of the Confederacy, to which they said they were aware of that, and that they were, nevertheless, confident that their interview would result in peace. The President, on this report of Colonel Ould, determined to permit them to come to Richmond under his charge.

On the evening of the 16th July, Colonel Ould conducted these gentlemen to a hotel in Richmond where a room was provided for them, in which they were to remain under surveillance during their stay here, and the next morning I received the following letter:

"Sportswood Hotel, RICHMOND, Va., July 17, 1864.

"Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, Confederate States of America:

"Dear Sir—The undersigned, James F. Jaques, of Illinois, and James R. Gilmore, of Massachusetts, most respectfully solicit an interview with President Davis. They visit Richmond as private citizens, and have no official character or authority; but they are fully possessed of the views of the United States Government relative to an adjustment of the differences now existing between the North and South, and have little doubt that a free interchange of views between President Davis and themselves, would open the way to such official negotiations as would ultimately restore PEACE to the two sections of our distracted country.

"They therefore ask an interview with the President, and awaiting your reply, are

"Most truly and respectfully,

"Your obedient servants,

"JAS. F. JACQUES,

"JAS. R. GILMORE."

The word "official" is underscored, and the word "peace" doubly underscored in the original.

After perusing the letter, I invited Colonel Ould to conduct the writers to my office, and on their arrival stated to them that they must be conscious they could not be admitted to an interview with the President without informing me more fully of the object of their mission, and satisfy me that they came by request of Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Gilmore replied that they came officially, but with the knowledge and at the desire of Mr. Lincoln; that they thought the war had gone far enough; that it could never end except by some sort of agreement; that the agreement might as well be made now as after still further bloodshed; that they knew by the recent address of the Confederate Congress that we were willing to make peace; that they admitted that proposals ought to come from the North, and that they were prepared to make these proposals by Mr. Lincoln's authority; that it was necessary to have a sort of informal understanding in advance of regular negotiations, for if Commissioners were appointed without some such understanding they would meet, quarrel and separate, leaving the parties more bitter against each other than before; that they knew Mr. Lincoln's views and would state them, if pressed by the President to do so, and desired to learn his in return.

I again insisted on some evidence that they came from Mr. Lincoln, and in order to satisfy me, Mr. Gilmore referred to the fact that permission for their coming through our lines had been asked officially by General Grant in a letter to Gen. Lee, and that Gen. Grant in that letter had asked that this request should be referred to President Davis. Mr. Gilmore then showed me a card, written and signed by Mr. Lincoln, requesting Gen. Grant to aid Mr. Gilmore and friend in passing through his lines into the Confederacy. Col. Jaques then said that his name was not put on the card for the reason that it was earnestly desired that their visit should be kept secret; that he had come into the Confederacy a year ago, and had visited Petersburg on a similar errand, and that it was feared if his name should become known that some of those who had formerly met him in Petersburg would conjecture the purpose for which he now came. He said that the terms of peace which they would offer to the President would be honorable to the Confederacy, that they did not desire that the Confederacy should accept any other terms, but would be glad to have my promise as they gave theirs, that their visit should be kept a profound secret if it failed to result in peace; that it would not be just that either party should seek any advantage by divulging the fact of their overture for peace, if unsuccessful. I assented to this request, and then, rising, said: "Do I understand you to state distinctly that you come as messengers from Mr. Lincoln for the purpose of agreeing with the President as to the proper mode of inaugurating a formal negotiation for peace, charged by Mr. Lincoln with authority for stating his own views and receiving those of President Davis? Both answered in the affirmative, and I then said that the President would see them at my office the same evening at 9 p. m.—that, at least, I presumed he would, but if he objected after hearing my report they should be informed. They were then committed to the charge of Colonel Ould, with the understanding that they were to be re-conducted to my office at the appointed hour, unless otherwise directed.

This interview, connected with the report previously made by Col. Ould, left on my mind the decided impres-

ion that Mr. Lincoln was averse to sending formal Commissioners to open negotiations, lest he might thereby be deemed to have recognised the independence of the Confederacy, and that he was anxious to learn whether the conditions on which alone he would be willing to take such a step would be yielded by the Confederacy; that with this view he had placed his messengers in a condition to satisfy not that they came from him, without committing himself to anything, in the event of a disagreement as to such conditions as he considered to be indispensable. On informing the President, thereof, of my conclusion, he determined that no question of form or etiquette should be an obstacle to his receiving any overtures that premised, however remotely, to result in putting an end to the carnage which marked the continuance of hostilities.

The President came to my office at nine o'clock in the evening, and Colonel Ould came a few moments later, with Messrs. Jaques and Gilmore. The President said to them that he had heard from me that they came as messengers of peace from Mr. Lincoln; that as such they were welcome; that the Confederacy had never concealed its desire for peace, and that he was ready to hear whatever they had to offer on that subject.

Mr. Gilmore then addressed the President, and in a few minutes had conveyed the information that these two gentlemen had come to Richmond impressed with the idea that this Government would accept a peace on the basis of a re-constitution of the Union, the abolition of slavery, and the grant of an amnesty to the people of the States as repentant criminals. In order to accomplish the abolition of slavery, it was proposed that there should be a general vote of all the people of both Confederacies, and the majority of the vote thus taken was to determine, as well as all other disputed questions. These were stated to be Mr. Lincoln's views. The President answered that as these proposals had been professed by the remark that the people of the North were a majority, and that a majority ought to govern, the offer was, in effect, a proposal that the Confederate States should surrender at discretion, admit that they had been wrong from the beginning of the contest, submit to the mercy of their enemies, and avow themselves to be in need of pardon for crimes; that extermination was preferable to such dishonor.

He stated that if they were themselves so unacquainted with the form of their own Government as to make such propositions, Mr. Lincoln ought to have known when giving them his views that it was out of the power of the Confederate Government to act on the subject of the domestic institutions of the several States, each State having exclusive jurisdiction on that point, still less to commit the decision of such a question to the vote of a foreign people; that the separation of the States was an accomplished fact; that he had no authority to receive proposals for negotiation except by virtue of his office as President of an independent Confederacy, and on this basis alone must proposals be made to him.

At one period of the conversation Mr. Gilmore made use of some language referring to these States as "rebels" while rendering an account of Mr. Lincoln's views and apologizing for the word. The President desired him to proceed, that no offence was taken, and that he wished Mr. Lincoln's language to be repeated to him as exactly as possible. Some further conversation took place, substantially to the same effect as the foregoing, when the President rose to indicate that the interview was at an end. The two gentlemen were then recommended to the charge of Colonel Ould and left Richmond the next day.

This account of the visit of Messrs. Gilmore and Jaques to Richmond has been rendered necessary by publications made by one or both of them since their return to the United States, notwithstanding the agreement

that their visit was kept secret. They have, perhaps, concluded that, as the promise of secrecy was made at their request, it was permissible to disregard it. We had no reason for desiring to conceal what occurred, and have, therefore, no complaint to make of the publicity given to the fact of the visit. The extreme inaccuracy of Mr. Gilmore's narrative will be apparent to you from the foregoing statement.

You have, no doubt, seen in the Northern papers an account of another conference on the subject of peace, which took place in Canada, at about the same date, between Messrs. C. C. Clay and J. P. Holcombe, Confederate citizens of the highest character and position, and Mr. Horace Greeley, of New-York, acting with authority of President Lincoln. It is deemed not improper to inform you that Messrs. Clay and Holcombe, although enjoying in an eminent degree the confidence and esteem of the President, were strictly accurate in their statement that they were without any authority from this Government to treat with that of the United States on any subject whatever. We had no knowledge of their conference with Mr. Greeley, nor of their proposed visit to Washington till we saw the newspaper publications. A significant confirmation of the truth of the statement of Messrs. Gilmore and Jaques that they came as messengers from Mr. Lincoln is to be found in the fact that the views of Mr. Lincoln, as stated by them to the President, are in exact conformity with the offensive paper addressed to "whom it may concern," which was sent by Mr. Lincoln to Messrs. Clay and Holcombe by the hands of his private Secretary, Mr. Hay, and which was properly regarded by those gentlemen as an intimation that Mr. Lincoln was unwilling that this war should cease while in his power to continue hostilities.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of State.

Hon. James M. Mason, Commissioner to the Continent, &c., &c., Paris.

THE PEACE MISSION.

Stephens and Hunter En Route for Washington

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1.—The Richmond Senate of Monday last says Alex H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter and James A. Campbell left yesterday morning on their way to Washington, to confer with President Lincoln on putting an end to the war if possible.

The circumstances under which these gentlemen departed on their mission is understood to be as follows:—

F. P. Blair having sought an unofficial and confidential interview with President Davis departed for Washington with an assurance that our President would be willing at any time, without any obstacle of form, to send agents or commissioners to Washington to confer about terms of peace, if informed in advance that said commissioners would be received.

On Mr. Blair's second mission to Richmond he brought the consent of President Lincoln to receive and confer with any agents informally sent with a view to the restoration of peace. The three gentlemen who left yesterday were thereupon selected by President Davis, and they have gone without formal credentials and merely as informal agents to see if it be possible to place a conference for peace on any basis which may serve for attaining so desirable results.

It is possible that success may attend these efforts; but prudence and wisdom demand that we indulge in no confident expectation, and that we relax not one moment in energetic exertion for the ensuing campaign.

From the choice made by the President, we may rest assured that no means will be left untried to effect a peace, if it can be possible to attain it.

But if the eminent citizens selected for the purpose shall fail in the attempt, one good result will certainly have been reached. All discordant counsels on this subject will have become reconciled, and it will no longer be in the power of the factious or the timid to persuade the people that peace can be reached by any path other than that open for us by stout hearts and stout hands.

The Richmond Whig contains the following:—

PETERSBURG, Jan. 29.—Messrs. Stephens, Hunter and Campbell, Commissioners, are in the city and will be passed by a flag of truce through Butler Johnson's lines to-morrow. Their mission excites much comment in all circles.

NEW YORK, Feb. 1.—The Commercial's Washington special says it is positively asserted that Messrs. Stephens and Hunter, Rebel Peace Commissioners, are in that city.

Albany Eve Journal

2/2/65

AY, FEBRUARY 3, 1865.

THIRD EDITION.

BY TELEGRAPH

TO THE

BOSTON DAILY EVENING TRANSCRIPT.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT FORTRESS MONKOK.

Reported Basis of Compromise.

JEFF. DAVIS TO MEET PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

FEARS OF THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS.

New York, 3d. The Times Washington despatch says Secretary Seward telegraphed from Fortress Monroe to the President that his presence was needed immediately. Hence he departed at once.

The Tribune's despatch says the sentiment this evening is that President Lincoln will offer the rebels a general amnesty and a repeal of the confiscation act. Jeff Davis is said to be on the way to meet Mr. Lincoln. It is a significant fact that none of the cabinet has been consulted in this peace matter except Mr. Seward and Postmaster General Denison.

Leading members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War denounce the whole business, and predict the party will be sold out, and the peace we obtain, if any, will dishonor us. They charge that one after another will be thrown out, the party that elected Mr. Lincoln divided, and Mr. Lincoln thrown into the arms of the Democrats.

The Wor'd's Washington despatch also says that only Mr. Seward has been consulted in this peace matter, and that the prompt action of him and the President shows a disposition to make concessions that will secure peace. The radical portion of the party, however, are much offended at their action, and threaten investigation, etc.

Moderato men declare that the Administration are prepared to make concessions, and those who profess to know the South, say they will accept nothing short of recognition.

The correspondents describe the enthusiasm occasioned among the soldiers on both sides of the lines, when the rebel commissioners passed, as being of the most lively character. First the rebel soldiers cheered themselves hoarse, and then the Union troops took it up and continued it long and loud.

The Tribune's Washington despatch says Judge Campbell of the rebel Commission, disgusted with the delay, has gone back to Richmond. It also says the temper of the army is unmistakably for fighting it out and hammering the rebels into submission.

BOSTON ADV

THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

Mr. Seward's Official Account of the Hampton Roads Negotiations.

The Rebels Propose an Armistice at Home and a War Abroad.

Mr. Lincoln Insists on Surrender and Emancipation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Feb. 7, 1865.

MR. SEWARD TO MR. ADAMS.

SIR: It is a truism that in times of peace there are always instigators of war. So soon as a war begins, there are citizens who impatiently demand negotiations for peace. The advocates for war, after an agitation longer or shorter, generally gain their fearful end, though the war declared is not unfrequently unnecessary and unwise. So peace agitators, in time of war, ultimately bring about an abandonment of the conflict—sometimes without securing the advantages which were originally expected from the conflict.

The agitators for war in time of peace, and for peace in time of war, are not necessarily, or perhaps ordinarily, unpatriotic in their purposes and motives. Results alone determine whether they are wise or unwise. The treaty of peace concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo, was secured by an irregular negotiation under the ban of the Government. Some of the efforts which have been made to bring about negotiations with a view to end our civil war are known to the whole world, because they have employed foreign as well as domestic agents; others, with whom you have had to deal confidentially, are known to yourself, although they have not publicly transpired. Other efforts have occurred here, which are known only to the persons actually moving in them and to this Government. I am now to give you for your information an account of an affair of the same general character, which recently received much attention here, and which doubtless will excite inquiry abroad.

A few days ago Francis P. Blair, esq., of Maryland, obtained from the President a simple leave to pass through our military lines without definite views known to the Government. Mr. Blair visited Richmond, and on his return he showed to the President a letter which Jefferson Davis had written to Mr. Blair, in which Davis wrote that Mr. Blair was at liberty to say to President Lincoln that Davis was now, as he had always been, willing to send Commissioners, if assured they would be received, or to receive any that should be sent; that he was not disposed to find obstacles in forms. He would send Commissioners to confer with the President, with a view to a restoration of peace between the two countries, if he could be assured they would be received. The President thereupon, on the 18th of January, addressed a note to Mr. Blair, in which the President, after acknowledging that he had read the note of Mr. Davis, said he was, is, and always should be, willing to receive any agent that Mr. Davis, or any other influential person, now actually resisting the authority of the Government, might send to confer informally with the President with a view to the restoration of peace to the people of our common country. Mr. Blair visited Richmond with his letter and then came back again to Washington. On the 29th inst., we were advised from the camp of Lieut.-Gen. Grant that Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter and John A. Campbell were applying for leave to pass through the lines to Washington as Peace Commissioners to confer with the President. They were permitted by the Lieutenant-General to come to his headquarters, to await there the decision of the President. Major Eckert was sent down to meet the party from Richmond at Gen. Grant's headquarters. The Major was directed to deliver to them a copy of the President's letter to Mr. Blair, with a note to be addressed to them and signed by the Major, in which they were directly informed, that if they should be allowed to pass our lines they would be understood as coming for an informal conference upon the basis of the aforementioned letter of the 18th of January to Mr. Blair. If

they should express their assent to this condition in writing, then Major Eckert was directed to give them safe conduct to Fortress Monroe, when a person coming from the President would meet them. It being thought probable, from a report of their conversation with Lieutenant-General Grant, that the Richmond party would in the manner prescribed accept the condition mentioned, the Secretary of State was charged by the President with the duty of representing this Government at the expected informal conference. The Secretary arrived at Fortress Monroe on the night of the 1st day of February. Major Eckert met him in the morning of the 2d of February with the information that the persons who had come from Richmond had not accepted in writing the condition upon which he was allowed to give them conduct to Fortress Monroe. The Major had given the same information by telegraph to the President at Washington. On receiving this information, the President prepared a telegram directing the Secretary to return to Washington. The Secretary was preparing, at the same moment, to do so, without waiting for instructions from the President. But at this juncture Lieut.-Gen. Grant telegraphed to the Secretary of War, as well as to the Secretary of State, that the party from Richmond had reconsidered and accepted the conditions tendered them through Major Eckert, and Gen. Grant urgently advised the President to confer in person with the Richmond party.

Under these circumstances the Secretary, by the President's direction, remained at Fortress Monroe, and the President joined him there on the night of the 2d of February. The Richmond party was brought down the James River in a United States steam transport during the day, and the transport was anchored at Hampton Roads.

On the morning of the 3d the President, attended by the Secretary, received Messrs. Stephens, Hunter and Campbell, on board the United States steam transport "River Queen," in Hampton Roads. The Conference was altogether informal. There was no attendance of secretaries, clerks, or other witnesses. Nothing was written or read. The conversation, though earnest and free, was calm and courteous and kind on both sides. The Richmond party approached the discussion rather indirectly, and at no time did they either make categorical demands, or tender formal stipulations, or absolute refusals. Nevertheless, during the conference, which lasted four hours, the several points at issue between the Government and the insurgents were distinctly raised and discussed fully, intelligently, and in an amiable spirit. What the insurgent party seemed chiefly to favor was a postponement of the question of reparation upon which the war is waged, and a mutual direction of the efforts of Government, as well as those of the insurgents, to some extrinsic policy or scheme for a season, during which passion might be expected to subside and the armies to be reined, and trade and intercourse between the people of both sections reenmed. It was suggested by them that through such postponement we might now have immediate peace, with some not very certain prospect of an ultimate satisfactory adjustment of political relations between this Government and the States, section people now engaged in conflict with it.

This suggestion, though deliberately considered, was nevertheless regarded by the President as one of armistice or truce, and he announced that we can agree to no cessation or suspension of hostilities except on the basis of the disbandment of the insurgent forces and the restoration of the national authority throughout all the States in the Union. Collaterally and in subordination to the proposition that was thus announced, the anti-Slavery policy of the United States was reviewed in all its bearings, and the President announced that he must not be expected to depart from the positions he had heretofore assumed in his Proclamation of Emancipation and other documents, as these positions were reiterated in his last annual message. It was further declared by the President that the complete restoration of the national authority was an indispensable condition of any assent on our part to whatever form of peace might be proposed. The President assured the other party that while he must adhere to these positions, he would be prepared, so far as power is lodged with the Executive, to exercise liberality.

His power is limited by the Constitution. And when peace should be made, Congress must necessarily act in regard to appropriations of money and to the admission of Representatives from the insurrectionary States. The Richmond party were then informed that Congress had on the 31st ult. adopted, by a constitutional majority, a joint resolution, submitting to the several States the proposition to abolish Slavery throughout the Union,

and that there is every reason to expect that it will soon be accepted by three-fourths of the States, so as to become a part of the national organic law. The conference came to an end by mutual acquiescence, without procuring an agreement of views upon the several matters discussed, or any of them. Nevertheless, it is perhaps of some importance that we have been able to admit our opinions and views directly to prominent insurgents, and to hear them answer in a courteous and not unfriendly manner.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, esq., &c., &c.

REBEL VIEWS OF PEACE. The comments of the Richmond papers upon the peace negotiators, who have been admitted through our lines, are worthy of notice. While evidently disbelieving that anything of importance in the way of peace will come of the attempts at negotiation which these men may make, the rebel press plainly states its opinion that peace manœuvres damage the Confederate cause at home, by unsettling the popular faith in war, and by retarding movements with reference to its continuance. One of the fiercest war papers in Richmond says that there is no possibility that Jeff. Davis will gain any advantage over Mr. Lincoln, while the talk about peace has already produced division among the Confederates which cannot be easily repaired. The rebels seem to entertain the idea that Mr. Lincoln is abundantly able to maintain the honor of the Federal Government, and are fearful that Jeff Davis will come off second best in any transactions he may allow with the President of the United States.

BOSTON ADV

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S PEACE REPORT.

New York, 9th. The Presidential document relating to peace negotiations had not been sent into Congress up to one o'clock this afternoon. 12/65

PRES. LINCOLN INDORSED IN MISSOURI.

St. Louis, Mo., 13th. The State Convention today unanimously passed a resolution indorsing the action of the President in the peace conference, pledging the loyal people of Missouri to sustain the Government to the last extremity in prosecuting the war until peace shall be established or conquered on the basis contained in the President's note to Secretary Seward. *2/19/61*

PEACE RUMORS.

Sec. Seward and President Lincoln at City Point.

The Herald's Washington special says it is now understood, from the very highest and most reliable source, that Secretary Seward was sent for by President LINCOLN to come to City Point for consultation, and that arrangements are in progress for a consultation between LEE and GRANT, supported on one side by LINCOLN and Seward, and on the other by Davis and Hunter.

-Albany Evening Journal

March 31, 1865-

Peace.

President LINCOLN is at Fortress Monroe. Yesterday, Secretary SEWARD and several friends left Washington to join him there. It is rumored that a new Peace Conference is to be held at once. Indeed, the statement is made that interviews have already occurred preliminary to formal discussions, at one of which Gen. LEE and the President were together several hours.

The public will await an issue from these extraordinary movements with great anxiety. Now that the end of the war evidently draws nigh, it becomes a question of supreme importance how it shall be terminated. The loyal majority of the nation is earnestly desirous that further bloodshed shall be averted, and the normal conditions of peace restored. But it is equally emphatic in its demands that no propositions shall be made or acceded to on our part, which will lower in the least degree the standard upon which we have maintained the contest thus far.

Without assuming any especial knowledge upon the subject, we assume to say that the President will not make, and has not intended to make, any tender to the Rebels that will not meet with the approval of every true-hearted citizen. His ultimatum has already been announced, both in his conference with the Rebel Commissioners at Fortress Monroe, and in his inaugural address. When the Confederates lay down their arms, abandon their attempts to destroy our free institutions, and confess themselves subjugated by force against which it is madness for them longer to resist, they will be dealt with "upon the most liberal terms." The emancipation proclamation will not be withdrawn; no portion of the Rebel war debt will be assumed; the chiefs of Treason will not be restored to the civil rights they have forfeited. For the misguided and suffering people of the South, every possible exhibition of sympathy and lenity will be made,—for the originators of secession, nothing but justice tempered with mercy.

It is to be hoped that circumstances will soon set forth the President's policy in this matter, with distinctness. The absurd suggestions of Mr. GREELEY, in the *Tribune*, coupled with a hundred rumors of councils and proffers, fabricated from mischievous imagination, are engendering a feverish state of public sentiment; an intense curiosit, not unmixed with apprehension. It is best to have it made known, speedily and definitely, that Mr. LINCOLN does not participate in GREELEY'S monomania now, any more than he did a year ago.

We have no reason to expect anything from negotiations with DAVIS. Any peace which falls short of independence involves his doom. He would as willingly see chaos come again as the Union reconstructed. Behind him, and participating in this sentiment, are the chiefs who have staked their all upon the fate of Revolution. For them there is no middle course. They may stand ready to make the "most liberal treaties" of mutual alliance and defense; to join us in a foreign war; to pledge even the gradual extinction of Slavery. But they will say, as Mr. HUNTER said months

ago:—"A recognition of our independence is the indispensable preliminary of negotiation."

The masses of Southern people have no such feeling, because they are not in the like circumstances. Everything indicates that throughout all the States, there is growing dissatisfaction with the Richmond cabal; a complete disheartenment respecting the future of Treason, and a willingness to return to allegiance. The final negotiations must, therefore, be with the people. But the people are not to be reached through councils at Fortress Monroe and City Point. The way of approach to them lies over the battle-field. When LEE and JOHNSTON are whipped or surrendered; when Richmond and Petersburg is in our hands; when the stars and bars have gone down from the Confederate capital, then the heart of the South will have been subdued. And, it is probably safe to say, not until then.

We are glad to know, therefore, that GRANT'S army is in motion. At the same time, beyond doubt, SHERMAN has advanced upon JOHNSTON. All our available forces in North Carolina and Virginia may be at this moment confronting the two grand corps of the Rebels. Perhaps, within twenty-four hours, intelligence will be flashed to us over the wires, of "the beginning of the end." At least, if it does not arrive so soon, the crisis cannot be much longer delayed.

If the present military advance results in victory, then the President's opportunity will have arrived. Then he should issue an address to the Southern people, showing them that while uncompromising in conflict, we are magnanimous in triumph; that while we make no parley with a defiant foe, we visit no vengeance upon a prostrate enemy; that if we have proven we know how to wield the halberd in war, we cheerfully lay it aside for the pruning hook. He should kindly and with dignity, invite them back to their violated allegiance, assuring them that our quarrel has been with a wicked cause, and not with a deluded populace,—and presenting to them the advantages of a fraternal reunion, in which we may proceed, forgetful of the dark and bloody past, and animated by a common hope for the future, to work out our manifest destiny. And when such an appeal is made, we believe its response will be a voluntary submission of four fifths of the population embraced in the remaining Rebel territory.

3/31/63

THE PEACE AGENTS AT RICHMOND.
Transcribed 4-10-65
EXTRAORDINARY CONDUCT OF "EX-
TRA BILLY" SMITH.

New York, 8th. The Post's despatch says there is no doubt ex-Senator Hunter and Judge Campbell remained in Richmond to see what could be done about peace.

The President will probably soon issue another amnesty proclamation.

The Richmond Whig says Governor Smith made a speech Monday evening saying the rebel troops were victorious and that Richmond should not be evacuated, and then left on horseback.

A large number of prisoners have arrived in Washington and are desirous of taking the oath of allegiance.

Albany Evening Journal
April 11, 1865

The Peace Question.

—President Lincoln was closeted with his cabinet for several hours yesterday, as is supposed discussing the terms of his intended proclamation to the Southern people.

—There was no formal meeting of the Virginia Legislature last Friday; but at an irregular gathering, a committee was appointed to inform Gov. Smith and the Legislature of the terms proposed by the President, which the *Whig* understands to be of the most liberal character.

—In a little speech to a crowd at Washington, last evening, President Lincoln proposed three cheers for Gen. Grant. This is proof that he endorses the terms upon which the surrender of Lee was dictated. Those who make war upon the General, must expect to array themselves in opposition to the policy of the Administration.

—The *National Intelligencer* says that Judge Campbell and the other prominent Southerners who called upon the President, urged him to issue a proclamation offering liberal terms to the South. The reply of the President was, that the time had not yet arrived when he felt prepared to take such a step; that so long as Gen. Grant is pursuing the forces in the field, civil action must be withheld. The *Intelligencer* expresses the opinion that the proclamation will be given very speedily, and that it will be quite as broad as any loyalist could desire.

—The Richmond correspondent of the *New York Times* says the loyal people of that city insist that the work of reconstruction shall not be confided to Gov. Smith and the Legislature, for the reason that Smith has been one of their most bitter and unrelenting enemies from the beginning, and that the Legislature in no sense represents the wishes of the mass of the people. They demand that Virginia shall be taken back into the Union "under the Emancipation Proclamation;" that no vestige of the rebellion shall be tolerated; that the usurpation, State and Confederate, which has wrecked Virginia, shall not be recognized in a single respect; that the State Government must be organized anew, by a convention of the people, as soon as that can be properly effected, and the State and its inhabitants thoroughly purged of treason in every shape.

5 EFK

The Peace Question.

The Washington *Star* says the President yesterday telegraphed to Gov. Pierpont, at Alexandria, to come up and have an interview with him in reference to a removal to Richmond. This, if true, disposes of the rumor that Mr. Lincoln had proposed to recognize the Rebel Legislature and Gov. Smith.

The *Commercial's* Washington correspondent says there is a very general distrust there that any good will come out of the conference between the President and Judge Campbell, who is now in reality the Rebel Secretary of War. Thoughtful men believe it will be neither wise nor prudent to leave the question of reconstruction to the played-out Democratic politicians of the South.

A Washington dispatch to the New York *Commercial*, says:

The President makes no secret of his disposition to waive everything but Union and Emancipation for the sake of restoring tranquility. When in Richmond he arranged an audience for the return of Virginia to the Union. The State Department has grounds to believe the British Government will revoke the recognition of belligerent rights to the Confederacy on receipt of the President's Proclamation closing the ports and declaring the blockade at an end.

11/12/60

Worcester Daily Transcript.

The Liberty of the Press is essential to the Security of Freedom, and should be maintained as the Aegis of our National Wealth.

WORCESTER, MASS.

MONDAY EVENING, MAY 24, 1865.

THE LAST DAYS OF THE JEFF. DAVIS RULE. The New York Times publishes a letter from a gentleman who was private secretary to one of the most influential members of Jeff. Davis Cabinet, which throws a good deal of light on the character of that individual during the last days of his government. It appears that the leading rebels thought very lightly of his capacity to govern, and deemed him an incubus on their cause. He was utterly selfish and obdurate, and his Cabinet and Congress were merely the tools of his insatiable desire for power. He was rudely intolerant of any difference of opinion, hated men of independent judgment—in fact, was a perfect despot. His manifesto to Congress in November last, assuming a singular cheerfulness, did not serve to hoodwink the leading rebel politicians, and steps were openly and privately taken to induce Davis to agree to terms of peace with the Federal Government, on the ground that further efforts on the part of the South to continue the contest were hopeless. Davis refused, and the dissatisfaction with him increased. Wigfall of Texas was at the head of a party who aimed at the deposition of Davis and Stephens, but the sudden calamities which overtook the rebel cause confounded the conspirators, and their scheme and their victims. According to the writer's authority, the Confederate military strength before the capture of Richmond, east of the Mississippi, was about one hundred thousand men, all told. Davis and his fellow fugitives had but \$500,000 in their wallets on leaving the rebel capital, and this sum was mainly in silver, which accounts for its bulk. The principal portion of the rebel treasure, it seems, was in foreign hands—a fact which at least shows that, in spite of all the bluster and brag to the contrary, the necessity of an early flight had been anticipated, and in part provided for a considerable time before the military surrender.

MR. LINCOLN'S REPARTEE. The Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle contains a detailed account of the Peace Conference at Hampton Roads, on the authority of Alexander H. Stephens. His description of the interview is mainly like that given to the public by the Union authorities. The following incident of the conference has not got into print before:

Mr. Hunter insisted that the recognition of Davis's power to make a treaty was the first and indispensable step to peace, and referring to the correspondence between King Charles the First and his Parliament as a reliable precedent of a constitutional ruler treating with rebels.

Mr. Lincoln's face then wore that indescribable expression which generally preceded his hardest hits, and he remarked: "Upon questions of history I must refer you to Mr. Seward, for he is posted in such things, and I don't propose to be bright. My only distinct recollection of the matter is, that Charles lost his head." That settled Mr. Hunter for a while.

BOSTON ADV

THE CLAIM OF REBELS

What the Peace Commission of 1864 Wanted.

A Historical Letter to Confederate State Secretary.

Written by Clement C. Clay—His Views of Greeley and Abraham Lincoln—Reunion Could Not Be Considered. 1865

From the New York Mail and Express.

ST. CATHERINES, C. W., Aug. 11, 1864.—

Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Sec'y of State, Richmond, Va., C. S. A.: SIR—I deem it due to Mr. Holcombe and myself to address you in explanation of the circumstances leading to and attending our correspondence with Hon. Horace Greeley, which has been the subject of so much misrepresentation in the United States, and, if they are correctly copied, of at least two newspapers in the Confederate states. We address a joint and informal note to the president on this subject, but, as it was sent by a messenger under peculiar embarrassments, it was couched in very guarded terms, and was not so full or explicit as we originally intended or desired to make it. I hope he has already delivered it and has explained its purpose and supplied what was wanting to do us full justice.

WHAT THEY TALKED ABOUT.

Soon after the arrival of Mr. Holcombe, Mr. Thompson and myself in Canada West, it was known in the United States, and was the subject of much speculation there as to the object of our business. Some politicians, of more or less fame, and representing all parties in the United States, came to see Mr. H. and myself—Mr. T. being at Toronto and less accessible than we were at the Falls—either through curiosity or some better or worse motive. They found that our conversation was mainly directed to the mutual injury we were inflicting on each other by war, the necessity for peace in order to preserve whatever was valuable to both sections, and the probability of foreign intervention when we were thoroughly exhausted and unable to injure others, and the dictation of a peace less advantageous to both belligerents than they might now make if there was an armistice of sufficient duration to allow passion to subside and reason to resume its sway.

SANDERS, GREELEY AND JEWETT.

In the meantime Mr. George N. Sanders, who had preceded us to the Falls, was addressing, either directly or indirectly, his ancient and intimate party friends and others in the United States supposed to be favorably inclined, assuring them that a peace mutually advantageous to the North and the South might be made and inviting them to visit us that we might consider and discuss the subject. He informed us that Mr. Greeley would visit us if we would be pleased to see him. Believing from his antecedents that he was a sincere friend of peace, even with separation, if necessary, we authorized Mr. S. to say that we would be glad to receive him. Mr. G. replied, as we were told through Mr. Jewett—who had been an active and useful agent for communicating with citizens of the United States—that he would prefer to accompany us to Washington City to talk of peace, and would do so if we would go. We did not then believe that Mr. G. had authorized this proposal in his name, for neither we nor Mr. S. had seen it in any telegram or letter from

Mr. G. but had it only from the lips of Mr. Jewett, who is reported to be a man of fervid and fruitful imagination, and very credulous of what he wishes to be true. Notwithstanding, after calm deliberation and consultation, we thought that we could not, in duty to the Confederate states, decline the invitation, and directed Mr. S. to say that we would go to Washington if complete and *unqualified* protection was given us. We did not feel authorized to speak for Mr. Thompson, who was absent, and we moreover deemed it necessary that he or I should remain here to promote the objects that the secretary of war had given us and another in charge.

Mr. S. responded in his own peculiar style, as you have seen, or will see by the inclosed copy of the correspondence, which was published under my supervision.

MR. GREELEY SURPRISES THEM.

We did not expect to hear from Mr. Greeley again upon the subject, and were greatly surprised by his note from the United States side of the falls, addressed to us as "duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace." How or by whom that character was imputed to us we do not know. We suspect, however, that we are indebted for the attribution of the high and responsible office to Mr. Jewett, or to that yet more credulous and inventive personage Dame Rumor. Certainly we were not justly chargeable with having assumed or affected the character, or with having given any one sufficient grounds to infer that we came clothed with any such powers. We never sought or desired a safe conduct to Washington or an interview with Mr. Lincoln. We never proposed, suggested or intimated any terms of peace to any person that didn't embrace the independence of the Confederate states. We have been as jealous of the rights, interest and honor of our government as any of its citizens can be, and have never wittingly compromised them by act, word or sign. We have not felt it our duty to declare to all who approached us upon the subject that reunion was impossible under any change of the constitution or abridgement of the Federal government. We have not dispelled the fond delusion of most of those with whom we have conversed that some kind of common government might at some time hereafter be re-established. But, we have not induced or encouraged this idea. On the contrary, when obliged to answer the question: "Will the Southern States consent to reunion?" I have answered "Not now; you have shed so much of their best blood, have desolated so many homes, inflicted so much injury, caused so much physical and mental agony, and have threatened and attempted such irreparable wrongs—without justification or excuse, as they believe—that they would now prefer extermination to your embraces as friends and fellow citizens of the same government. You must wait till the blood of our slaughtered people has exhaled from the soil, till the homes which you have destroyed have been rebuilt, till our badges of mourning have been laid aside, and the memorials of our wrongs are no longer visible on every hand, before you propose to rebuild a joint and common government. But I think the South will agree to an armistice of six or more months, and to a treaty of amity and commerce, securing peculiar and exclusive privileges to both sections, and possibly to an alliance defensive, or even for some purposes both defensive and offensive."

HOPEFUL PEACEMAKERS.

If we can credit the asseverations of both peace and war Democrats uttered to us in person and through the presses of the U. S., our correspondence with Mr. Greeley has been promotive of our wishes. It has impressed all but fanatical abolitionists with the opinion that there can be no peace while Mr. Lincoln presides over the government of the U. S. All concede that we will not accept his terms, and scarcely any Democrat, and not all the Republicans, will insist on them. They are not willing to pay

the price his terms exact of the North. They see that he can reach peace only through subjugation of the South, which

but few think practicable; through universal bankruptcy of the North; through seas of their own blood as well as of ours; through the utter demoralization of their pupils and destruction of their republican governments; through anarchy and moral chaos—all of which is more repulsive and intolerable than even the separation and independence of the south.

MR. LINCOLN DENOUNCED.

All the Democratic presses denounce Mr. Lincoln's manifesto in strong terms, and many Republican presses (and among them the New York Tribune) admit it was a blunder. Mr. Greeley was chagrined and incensed by it, as his articles clearly show. I am told by those who profess to have heard his private expressions of opinion and feeling that he curses all fools in high places, and regards himself as deceived and maltreated by the administration. From all that I can see or hear I am satisfied that the correspondence has tended strongly toward consolidating the Democracy and dividing the Republicans and encouraging the desire for peace. Many prominent politicians of the United States assure us that it is the most opportune and efficient moral instrumentality for stopping the war that could have been conceived or exerted, and beg us to refrain from any vindication of our course or explanation of our purposes.

MR. GREELEY'S FAILURE.

At all events, we have developed what we desired to the eyes of our own people—that war, with all its horror, is less terrible and hateful than the alternative offered by Mr. Lincoln. We hope that none will hereafter be found in North Carolina, or in any other part of the Confederate States, so base as to insist that we shall make any more advances to him in behalf of peace, but that all of our citizens will gird themselves with renewed and redoubled energy and resolution to battle against our foes until our utter extermination, rather than halt to ponder the terms which he haughtily proclaims as his ultimata. If such be the effect of our correspondence, we shall be amply indemnified for all the misrepresentation which we have incurred or can incur.

VIRGINIA NEWSPAPERS DENOUNCED.

Mr. Greeley's purpose may have been merely to find out our conditions of peace, but we give him credit for seeking higher objects. While we contemplated and desired something more, yet it was part of our purpose to ascertain Mr. Lincoln's conditions of peace. We have achieved our purpose in part; Mr. Greeley has failed altogether. He correctly reports us as having proposed no terms. We never intended to propose any till instructed by our government. We have suffered ourselves to be falsely reported as proposing certain terms—among them reunion—for reasons that our judgments approved, hoping that we would in due time be fully vindicated at home.

If there is no more wisdom in our country than was displayed in the malignant article of the Richmond Examiner and Petersburg Register, approving of the ukase of Mr. Lincoln, the war must continue until neutral nations interfere and command the peace. Such articles are copied into all the Republican presses of the United States, and help them more in encouraging the prosecution of the war than anything they can themselves utter.

EXAGGERATED DISCONTENT.

If I am not deceived, the elements of convulsion and revolution existing in the North have been greatly agitated by the *pronunciamento* of the autocrat of the White House. Not only Democrats, but Republicans, are protesting against a draft to swell an army to fight to free negroes, and are declaring more boldly for state rights and the Union as it was. Many say the draft cannot and shall not be enforced. The Democracy are beginning to learn that they must endure persecution, outrage and tyranny at the hands of the Republicans just as soon as they can

bring back their armed legions from the South. They read their own fate in that of the people of Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland. They are beginning to lean more on the side of our people as their natural allies and as the champions of state rights and of popular liberty. Many of them would gladly lock arms with our soldiers in crushing their common enemy, the abolitionists. Many of them would fall into our lines if our armies occupied any states north of the Ohio, for a month or even a week. Many of them are looking to the time when they may flee their country or fight for their inalienable rights. They are preparing for the latter alternative.

INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWED.

The instructions of the secretary of war to us and the officer detailed for special service have not been neglected. We have been arranging for the indispensable co-operation. It is promised, and we hope will soon be furnished. Then we will act. We have been disappointed and delayed by causes which cannot now explain.

I fondly trust that our efforts will not be defeated or hindered by unwise and intemperate declarations of the public opinion by newspaper editors or others who are regarded as its exponents. We have a difficult role to play and must be judged with charity until heard in our own defense.

I am much indebted to Mr. Holcombe, Mr. Sanders and Mr. Tucker for the earnest and active aid they have given me in promoting the objects of Mr. Thompson's and my mission. Mr. T. is at Toronto and Mr. H. is at the Falls. If here, or if I could delay the transmission of his communication, I should submit it to them for some expression of their opinions.

As I expect this to reach the Confederate states by a safe hand, I do not take the time and labor necessary to put it in cipher—if, indeed, there is anything in it worth concealing from our enemies.

I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, yr. obt. svt. C. C. CLAY, JR.

(Indorsed) "Rec'd 12th Sept., '64. J. P. B.

Lincoln at Hampton Roads.

The South Might Have Obtained Almost Any Concession Short of Separation.

The following account of Mr. Lincoln's course at the Hampton Roads conference is from a letter to Henry Watterson in the Louisville *Courier-Journal*:

"Soon after Mr. Stephens was inaugurated Governor of Georgia, in the year 1882, he spent a day at my residence at West End in this city.

"After dinner, while talking over various matters connected with the war, I asked him if he ever had any hope that the Hampton Roads conference would result differently from the way it did.

"I had great hope," he said, "when the question was first agitated about the conference. I was always in favor of settling the war and preventing further bloodshed, and when the conference was suggested by Mr. Blair and others I took a very active part in pushing it. There was very bitter opposition to it on the part of the friends of President Davis in the Confederate Congress, but finally it was authorized and commissioners selected to attend the conference. Much to my regret these commissioners were given specific instructions which prevented them negotiating for peace on any other basis than that which guaranteed the independence and autonomy of the Confederate States. I had several talks with President Davis, in which I urged him to give the commissioners full power to negotiate a peace settlement without restrictions, suggesting the wisdom of hampering the commission with any instructions and to permit it as wide a range as possible, reserving the right if deemed wise, to reject or approve whatever it might do in the way of recommending a basis for settlement. President Davis did not give us any encouragement on that line; on the other hand, the day that we left, we were given specific instructions and were pointedly informed that no settlement could be considered that did not recognize the independence of the Confederate government. This disheartened me very much, for I knew it would be a stumbling block in our way, and so told my associates. In fact, I made up my mind that the conference would be fruitless, and told my friends that I would decline the appointment. They prevailed upon me to make the effort, and I consented solely on the ground that it was my duty to do everything possible to bring an end to strife, but I had no hope of a successful termination of the conference. Mr. Lincoln and his associates were on board a steamer when we arrived at Hampton Roads. He was very cordial in his greeting, and created quite a laugh at my expense. I had on a very heavy overcoat and a large comforter wrapped around my neck. As I commenced to unfold myself, taking off first the woollen comforter and then the overcoat, Mr. Lincoln turned to his friends and said with a smile: 'Now, gentlemen, you see what a large amount of 'shuck' Mr. Stephens has—just wait a minute and you will be surprised to find what a small 'nubbin' he is.'

"After we had returned to the saloon of the steamer," continued Mr. Stephens, "Mr. Lincoln was very talkative and pleasant with all of the commissioners. He seemed to be in a splendid humor, and was in excellent spirits. After awhile I joined him and we went apart from the others and sat down at a small table where there was writing material. This was before any formal discussion had commenced. He broached the subject of the conference and expressed special pleasure at the fact that I was one of the commissioners. He said to me with great earnestness: 'I believe you and I can settle this matter. I know you and you know me. I have confidence in your integrity, and I believe you have in mine. I do not think you would ask me to do anything which I think improper, and I would not require your consent to anything which I believed unjust.' Picking up a piece of paper and pushing it toward me, he said: 'I will write one word at the top of this sheet of

with that word as a basis, you may write out the terms of settlement, and on that I will use all my influence to have Congress settle as we agree.'

"I then told him what our instructions were from President Davis, and when I did a cloud came over his face, his chin dropped to his breast, and for several minutes he did not say a word. After a pause he raised out of his seat and said to me, with hands uplifted, 'Then I am not responsible for any further bloodshed. I had hoped the war would end with this conference, but it is impossible to make any settlement with the instructions by which you are bound. I trust you will consider confidential what has occurred between us.'

"If we had been empowered to negotiate a settlement, with the preservation of the Union as a basis, the South would have been paid for its slaves, and we would have gotten any just and reasonable recognition at the hands of Mr. Lincoln. Of course, our instructions binding us to recognize only the independence of the South prevented our accomplishing anything, for at the threshold of Mr. Lincoln's desire for peace was his determination that it must be based upon Union."

"These are the words, as near as I can remember, which Mr. Stephens spoke at my residence. With the exception of my family, the only person present was the late Mark W. Johnston, an intimate friend of Mr. Stephens since boyhood and a neighbor of mine, whom I had invited over to take dinner with us.

"I asked Mr. Stephens at that time to permit me to publish the conversation, but he expressed his preference to have nothing said about it, as the conference was a matter of unwritten history, and he did not feel even then authorized to make it public. Since, however, the matter has come up for newspaper discussion, I think it but just to all concerned that the public be given the benefit of this statement from one of the most important characters in that noted conference.

"You are at liberty to make such use of this letter as you may deem proper, and if you care to publish it you can do so, telegraphing me on what day it will appear, and I will give it simultaneous publication in the *Constitution*. Very truly yours,

"EVAN P. HOWELL."

CIVIL WAR

Fifty Years Ago Today

July 16, 1864.—Two Self-Appointed Peace Commissioners From the North, Colonel James F. Jaquess of Illinois and J. R. Gilmore ("Edmund Kirke"), Arrived in Richmond Under Flag of Truce—An Interview With Jefferson Davis.

Fifty years ago today two self-appointed peace commissioners from the north, Colonel James F. Jaquess of the Seventy-third Illinois infantry and J. R. Gilmore, a well known writer ("Edmund Kirke"), arrived in Richmond under flag of truce and put up at the Spotswood hotel.

The purpose of their visit to the confederate capital was to secure an interview with Jefferson Davis. This Mr. Davis was prepared to give them. It was destined to lead to no positive result, but it was to prove historically important on account of the clearcut record that was made of it by Mr. Gilmore, showing the exact attitude and manner of the president of the confederacy in defining his position and that of the south at a time when the cause he was representing was tottering, and but for the genius of Lee would have been in extremities.

Colonel Jaquess before the war was a Methodist minister and teacher at Quincy, Ill. He was an earnest and forceful character, who felt that "God had laid the duty upon him" of attempting to secure peace. He had tried without success, the year before, to get through the lines to Richmond. President Lincoln, who knew him, had been requested to aid him in his mission, but had refrained from doing so.

When in July, 1864, Colonel Jaquess renewed his application for aid to President Lincoln—having meanwhile interested in his undertaking Mr. Gilmore, who had been much with the western armies as a newspaper correspondent—Lincoln gave him a pass to City Point and to Mr. Gilmore this note: "Will General Grant allow J. R. Gilmore and friend to pass our lines with ordinary baggage and go south? A. LINCOLN."

This was all in the way of credentials that the two commissioners carried to the front. Grant hesitated about passing them through the lines, but after telegraphing about them to Washington allowed them to get in touch with Judge Robert Ould, the confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, who on learning their mission secured permission for them to proceed to Richmond.

Meeting Mr. Davis.

On the morning of July 16 Colonel Jaquess and Mr. Gilmore passed out of the union lines near Deep Bottom, escorted by a number of federal officers, and were received within the confederate lines. Judge Ould, waiting for nightfall before starting, drove them to Richmond, where they arrived at 10 p. m. An officer of the provost guard at Richmond, Charles Jaynes, was assigned to remain with the visitors during their stay in Richmond and slept in the room with them.

On the morning following their arrival Messrs. Jaquess and Gilmore, at the suggestion of Judge Ould, addressed a note to Judah P. Benjamin, secretary of state, requesting an interview with Mr. Davis.

A reply from Mr. Benjamin contained an invitation for them to visit him at his office.

Mr. Benjamin questioned the two men closely as to whether they came with authority to represent Mr. Lincoln. They informed him they did not, but that they knew Lincoln's views and the sentiments of the people of the north and were confident that they could propose a basis for peace.

They were then told that Mr. Davis would see them at 9 that evening.

confederacy, but we will be free! We will govern ourselves. We will do it, if we have to see every southern plantation sacked and every southern city in flames."

Colonel Jaquess now said that he saw it was useless to prolong the interview. He apologized for pressing his views upon Mr. Davis. Love of the old flag must be his apology.

"You have not intruded upon me," said Mr. Davis, in his usual manner. "I am glad to have met you, both. I once loved the old flag as well as you do; I would have died for it; but now it is to me an emblem of oppression."

Half an hour's conversation on general topics followed. The visit lasted two hours. Mr. Davis is saying good by to Colonel Jaquess took the northern preacher-soldier's hand in both of his and said:

"Colonel, I respect your character, and I wish you well," and as he passed Colonel Jaquess out of the room: "Say to Mr. Lincoln for me that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals or peace on the basis of our independence. It will be useless to approach men in any other way."

The two northern visitors were escorted back to the federal lines next day. Their report was gratifying to Lincoln—it confirmed what he had asserted from the first, that the war could only be ended by force.

Colonel Jaquess subsequently took the stump for Lincoln, and his vivid description of his interview with Jefferson Davis did much toward silencing voters who had criticised Lincoln for not making overtures to the confederates.

"I am glad to see you, gentlemen. You are very welcome to Richmond."

This was Jefferson Davis.

Not Fighting for Slavery.

Mr. Davis at once referred to the object of the visit. Mr. Gilmore replied that they too had come to ask how peace might be brought about. Mr. Davis replied at once:

"In a very simple way. Withdraw your armies from our territory, and peace will come of itself. We do not seek to subjugate you. . . . Let us alone and peace will come at once."

"But we cannot let you alone so long as you repudiate the union. That is the one thing the northern people will not surrender."

"I know. You would deny us what you exact for yourselves—the right of self-government."

Discussion followed. Mr. Davis declared there could be no union between north and south. Mr. Jaquess asked him if, as a Christian man, he could leave untried any means that might lead to peace.

"No, I cannot," replied Mr. Davis. "I desire peace as much as you do. I deplore bloodshed as much as you do; but I feel that not one drop of the blood shed in this war is on my hands—I can look up to God and say this. I tried all in my power to avert this war. I saw it coming, and for twelve years I worked night and day to prevent it, but I could not. The north was mad and blind, and it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came, and now it must go on till the last man of the generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize the musket, and fight his battle, unless you acknowledge our rights to self-government. We are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for independence—and that or extermination we will have."


Slavery, declared Mr. Davis, had never been an essential element in the war. "It was only the means of bringing other conflicting elements to an earlier culmination. It fired the musket that was already capped and loaded."

Love of Old Flag Gone.

The two northern men pleaded and argued in turn. There was time for the south to yield gracefully; the north must crush it in the end; an election might be held, in all the states, and a majority vote might settle the points at issue. Amnesty would be offered; there would be no confiscation of property; the slaves would be emancipated.

"Amnesty, sir, applies to criminals," said Mr. Davis, with a show of anger. "We have committed no crime. . . . You may emancipate every negro in the

Judge's Diary Reveals Lincoln as Peace Leader



Abraham Lincoln

Pres. Abraham Lincoln, the "tall, gaunt looking figure," the man "with ample understandings, Briarean arms and a face radiant with intelligence and humor," was seen through the eyes of Judge Joseph T. Mills, of Lancaster, as "heaven's instrument to conduct his people through this

sea of blood to a Canaan of peace and freedom," in a diary record of an interview held in the national capital 76 years ago with the Great Emancipator whose birthday is celebrated tomorrow.

The Wisconsin State Historical society has what is believed to be (Continued on Page 6, Column 7)

a heretofore unpublished account written by the pioneer Grant county jurist and churchman following his meeting with the Civil war president at Washington on Aug. 19, 1864. This report is found in the diary of Judge Mills, who went to Washington as a representative of the Wisconsin Sanitary commission, the predecessor of the modern Red Cross.

Judge Mills' private papers and diaries are now in the possession of the historical society. The volume devoted to the year 1864 contains the written account of the meeting between Pres. Lincoln and the long deceased lead-region leader of Civil war days.

Political Figure

Judge Mills was widely known throughout southwestern Wisconsin. He was long a prominent political figure, helped establish the first Presbyterian church in Lan-

caster, and was active in the work of the U. S. Sanitary commission. The sanitary commission served much the same functions in its time as did the Red Cross during the World war. Funds were raised for its support, and women of the North worked to supply it with bandages and other materials to be used at battlefield hospital dressing stations.

He went to Washington as a representative of the Wisconsin unit of the commission, and while there, in company with the then former Wisconsin governor, Alex W. Randall, saw the president.

Judge Mills was a colorful figure in Wisconsin life, and his diary account of his meeting with Pres. Lincoln is likewise colorful. It is freely sprinkled with classical illusions, indicative of the jurist's learning.

The interview took place shortly before the national conventions to name presidential candidates for the forthcoming elections. Northern Democrats favored modification or abrogation of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, and the interview, as recorded by Mills, veered naturally towards politics.

Concerning Democratic platform proposals for the restoration of slaves to the Southerners, Pres. Lincoln is quoted by Judge Mills as follows:

"There have been men base enough to propose to me to return to slavery the black warriors of Port Hudson and Ocutee, and thus gain the respect of the masters they fought. Should I do so, I should deserve to be damned in time and eternity. Come what will, I will keep my faith with friend and foe. My enemies pretend I am now carrying on this war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I am president, it shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring the union. But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the emancipation policy and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion."

The full account of Judge Mills' meeting with Pres. Lincoln, written in pencil in the judge's diary shortly after it took place in an ante-room of the white house, follows in full:

Gov. Randall asked a man in waiting if the president had arrived. "Yes," was the reply. We entered a neat, plainly furnished room. A marble table was in the center. Directly there appeared from an adjoining room a tall, gaunt looking figure, shoulders inclined forward, his gait astride, rapid and shuffling, ample understandings with large slippers and Briarean arms, with a face radiant with intelligence and humor.

The governor addressed him: "Mr. President, this is my friend and your friend, Judge Mills from Wisconsin."

"I am glad to see my friends from Wisconsin. They are the hearty friends of the union," Lincoln answered.

"I could not leave the city, Mr. President," I said, without hearing from you word of cheer. Upon you, as the representative of the loyal people, depend, as we believe, the existence of our government and the future of America."

This introduced political topics.

"Mr. President," said Gov. Randall, "why can't you seek seclusion and play hermit for a fortnight? It would invigorate you.

Admits He's Not Free

"Aye," said the president, "two or three weeks would do me no good. I cannot fly from my thoughts—my solicitude for this great country follows me wherever I go. I don't think it is personal vanity or ambition, though I am not free from these infirmities, but feel that the weal or woe of this great nation will be decided in November. There is no program offered by any wing of the Democratic party but that must result in the permanent destruction of the union."

"But, Mr. President, Gen. McClellan is in favor of crushing out the rebellion by force. He will be the Chicago candidate."

"Sir," said the president, "the slightest knowledge of arithmetic will prove to any man that the rebel armies cannot be destroyed with Democratic strategy. It would sacrifice all the white men in the north to do it. There are now in the service of the United States 200,000 able bodied colored men, most of them under arms, defending and acquiring union territory. The Democratic strategy demands that these forces be disbanded, and that the masters be conciliated by restoring them to slavery. The black men, who now assist union prisoners to escape, they are to be converted into our enemies, in the vain hope of gaining the good will of their masters.

Success Inevitable

"You cannot conciliate the South if you guaranteed to them ultimate success. And the experience of the present war proves their success is inevitable, if you fling the compulsory labor of millions of black men into their side of the scale. Will you give our enemies such military advantages

as insure success and then depend on coaxing, flattery and concession to get them back into the union? Abandon all posts now garrisoned by black men; take 200,000 from our side and put them in the battlefields or corn-fields against us and we would be compelled to abandon the war in three weeks.

"We have to hold territory in inclement and sickly places; where are the Democrats to do this? It was a free fight and the field was open for the war Democrats to put down this rebellion by fighting against both master and slave long before the present policy was inaugurated.

"There have been men base enough to propose to me to return to slavery the black warriors of Port Hudson and Ocutee, and thus gain the respect of the masters they fought. Should I do so, I should deserve to be damned in time and eternity. Come what will, I will keep my faith with friend and foe. My enemies pretend I am now carrying on this war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I am president, it shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring the union. But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the emancipation policy and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion.

"Freedom has been given 200,000 men raised on southern soil. It will give us more yet. Just so much it has subtracted from the enemy, and instead alienating the South, there are now evidences of a fraternal feeling growing up between our men and the rank and file of the rebel soldiers. Let my enemies prove to the country that the destruction of slavery is not necessary to a restoration of the union. I will abide the issue."

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Deep Convictions

I saw that the president was not a mere joker, but a man of deep convictions, of abiding faith in justice, truth and providence. His voice was pleasant; his manner earnest and emphatic. As he warmed to the theme, his mind grew to the magnitude of his body. I felt I was in the presence of the great guiding intellect of his age and that those "huge Atlantean shoulders were fit to bear the weight of mightiest monarchs." His transparent honesty, republican simplicity, his gushing sympathy for those who offered their lives for their country, his utter forgetfulness of self in his concern for its welfare, could not but inspire me with confidence that he was Heaven's instrument to conduct his people through this sea of blood to a Canaan of peace and freedom.

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LINCOLN LORE

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THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS

Seventy-five years ago this month a concerted effort was made to bring the war between the North and the South to a close through compromise. Negotiations which began just before the New Year came in, were concluded just after the month of January had come to a close without accomplishing the desired end. The effort put forth, however, is of interest to all students of history and especially so at this time of military unrest in Europe.

Nine men were more or less involved in the proceedings: Francis P. Blair, Sr., the original promoter of the plan, President Lincoln, Secretary Seward, and General Grant representing the North; and President Davis, three commissioners, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, and General Lee representing the South.

Francis P. Blair, Sr., an influential politician, conceived the idea of becoming a mediator between the divided parts of the Union. On December 24, 1864, President Lincoln upon the request of Mr. Blair, signed a pass which he worded as follows:

"Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr. to pass our lines, go South and return."

It will be observed from the note that President Lincoln did not invest Blair with any governmental authority but that the envoy went wholly on his own responsibility. Blair had in mind what has become known as the Mexican Project which he felt would appeal to both sides in the struggle. He proposed that, inasmuch as slavery was now doomed, the North and South forget their differences to unite in driving an European power out of Mexico.

In conference with President Davis, a commission to confer with President Lincoln was suggested, and a note was given to Mr. Blair in which President Davis said:

"I would, if you could promise that a commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference, with a view to secure peace to the two countries."

Lincoln did not take kindly to the Mexican Project which was looked upon as a "joint filibustering foray," but he did open the doors of negotiation a little wider in the hope that the ultimate objective could be agreed upon. He wrote in part to Mr. Blair on January 18:

"I have constantly been, am now, and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he (Davis) or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me, with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country."

It will be observed that President Davis spoke of "the two countries" while President Lincoln mentioned "our one common country." Mr. Blair, not yet willing to give up his "joint invasion of Mexico" project, thought that General Lee and General Grant might declare an armistice which would pave the way for joint movements, but this did not materialize.

The Blair private mission did pave the way, however, for two conferences. In the first one the South was represented by the Confederate officials, Vice-President Alexander H. Stephens, Senator R. M. T. Hunter, and Assistant Secretary of War John A. Campbell; the Union was represented by Secretary Seward. In a memorandum prepared for Secretary Seward, the President had noted three definite requisites.

"First. Restoration of the national authority throughout all the states.

"Second. No receding by the executive on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress and in preceding documents.

"Third. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government."

Nothing came of this conference, but a dispatch from General Grant, who had made arrangements for the conference at Fortress Monroe, contained this suggestion:

"I fear now their (southern commission) going back without any expression from anyone in authority will have a bad influence . . . I am sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the two named in this dispatch (Stevens and Hunter) if not all three now within our lines."

President Lincoln decided to go at once to Hampton Roads, and then on board the *River Queen* entered into a four hour conference with the commissioners and Mr. Seward. It was agreed that no writing or memorandum should be made at the time of the conference. We have the reminiscences of the southern commissioners who later reported Mr. Lincoln's relations to five different subjects which were discussed:

I. Reconstruction. "When the resistance ceased and the national authority was recognized, the Southern states would be immediately restored to their peculiar relation to the Union."

II. Confiscation. "He (Mr. Lincoln) should exercise the power of the Executive with the utmost liberality."

III. The Emancipation Proclamation. "Mr. Lincoln said that was a judicial question . . . the proclamation was a war measure, and would have effect only from its being an exercise of the war power. As soon as the war ceased it would not be in operation for the future."

IV. Division of Virginia. "Mr. Lincoln said he could only give an individual opinion which was that western Virginia would continue to be recognized as a separate state in the Union."

V. The Thirteenth Amendment. On this question Mr. Seward is said to have mentioned that Congress had passed but not ratified the Amendment rather implying that the immediate relief of the southern states would prevent the immediate abolition of slavery.

On February 8 Congress asked President Lincoln to submit a report of the Hampton Roads conference, and two days later he submitted the correspondence which he had carried on with Mr. Blair as well as other dispatches referring to the incident. There was also filed by Secretary Seward an informal report of what took place at the second conference at Hampden Roads. He submitted some of the various points raised for discussion as follows:

1. The declaration of an armistice.
2. A review of the anti-slavery policy.
3. The ultimate results of the Emancipation Proclamation.
4. The restoration of national authority.
5. The liberal policy of the Chief Executive.
6. Congressional action in view of the Constitution.
7. The amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery.

This second conference with Lincoln present did not result in any agreement for peace, and after President Davis had reported the results of the conference to the Confederate Congress, he (Davis) urged a renewed offensive on their military fronts.

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THE PEACE RESOLUTIONS IN ILLINOIS

The states of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois might be personified as the three "Mid-West Sisters." The loyalties of two of them to their Uncle Sam during the Civil War were often challenged. Vallandingham and his Copperheads in Ohio and Voorhees and his Knights of the Golden Circle, in Indiana, became notorious in their fifth column activities to undermine the Lincoln administration.

Little has been said, however, about O'Brien and his "Fire-in-the-Rear" patriots of Illinois. Possibly the casual reader has felt that inasmuch as Lincoln was an Illinois man his administration received unanimous support from that state. But this third sister, Illinois, was not always commendable for her loyalty during the rebellion.

Similar to the movements in both Ohio and Indiana, the Illinois fifth column activities were largely political in origin and effort. The Vallandingham of Illinois was W. W. O'Brien, of Peoria. It is the same O'Brien who is quoted by the *Chicago Times* as having said at the 1864 Democratic Convention in Chicago, that the candidate nominated would on the following inauguration day in March "apply his boot to 'old Abe's posterior' and kick him out of the presidential chair."

O'Brien conceived and guided successfully through the House a vicious bill known as "The Illinois Peace Resolutions of 1863." It carried in this branch of the legislature by a vote of 52 to 28. The humiliation was much more accentuated by the fact that the vote was taken on Lincoln's birthday. The bill struck a snag in the State Senate, however, where a tie vote was registered. Lieutenant Governor Hoffman, then casting the vote against the "Fire-in-the-Rear" patriots, and Governor Yates adjourned the session. There is not room in a single issue of *Lincoln Lore* to present these peace resolutions in full, but the most important resolutions are supplied as Illinois' contributions to the fifth column activities of 1863.

Resolved, by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring herein), That the army was organized, confiding in the declaration of the President in his inaugural address—to-wit: that he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it existed, and that he believed he had no lawful right to do so, and that he had no inclination to do so; and upon the declaration of the Federal Congress—to-wit: that this war is not waged in any spirit of oppression or subjugation, or any purpose of overthrowing any of the institutions of any of the States: and that inasmuch as the whole policy of the Administration since the organization of the army has been at war with the declarations aforesaid, culminating in the emancipation proclamation, leaving the fact patent that the War has been diverted from its first avowed object to that of subjugation and the abolition of slavery, a fraud, both legal and moral, has been perpetrated upon the brave sons of Illinois, who have so nobly gone forth to battle for the Constitution and the laws; and, while we protest against the continuance of this gross fraud upon our citizen soldiers, we thank them for that heroic conduct on the battlefield that sheds imperishable glory on the State of Illinois.

Resolved, That we believe the further prosecution of the present War cannot result in the restoration of the Union and the preservation of the Constitution as our fathers made it unless the President's emancipation proclamation be withdrawn.

Resolved, That while we condemn and denounce the flagrant and monstrous usurpations of the Administra-

tion and encroachments of Abolitionism, we equally condemn and denounce the ruinous heresy of Secession as unwarranted by the Constitution and destructive alike of the security and perpetuity of our Government and the peace and liberty of the people; and fearing, as we do, that it is the intention of the present Congress and Administration at no distant day to acknowledge the independence of the Southern Confederacy and thereby sever the Union, we hereby solemnly declare that we are unalterably opposed to any such severance of the Union, and that we never can consent that the great Northwest shall be separated from the Southern States comprising the Mississippi Valley. That river shall never water the soil of two nations, but, from its source to its confluence with the gulf, shall belong to one great and united people.

Resolved, That peace, fraternal relations, and political fellowship should be restored among the States; that the best interests of all and the welfare of man required that this should be done in the most speedy and most effective manner; that it is to the people we must look for a restoration of the Union and the blessings of peace, and to these ends we shall direct our earnest and honest efforts; and hence we are in favor of the assembling of a National convention of all the States to so adjust our National difficulties that the States may hereafter live in harmony, each being secured in the rights guaranteed respectively to all by our fathers; and which convention, we recommend, shall convene at Louisville, Ky., or such other place as shall be determined upon by Congress or the several States at the earliest practicable period.

Resolved, further, therefore, That, to retain the object of the foregoing resolutions, we hereby memorialize the Congress of the United States, the Administration at Washington, and the Executives and Legislatures of the several States to take such immediate action as shall secure an armistice in which the rights and safety of the Government shall be fully protected for such length of time as may be necessary to enable the people to meet in convention aforesaid; and we therefore earnestly recommend to our fellow-citizens everywhere to observe and keep all their lawful and constitutional obligations, to abstain from all violence and to meet together and reason each with the other upon the best mode to attain the great blessing of peace, unity, and liberty; and be it further

Resolved, That, to secure the cooperation of the States and the General Government, Stephen T. Logan, Samuel S. Marshall, H. K. S. O'Melveny, William C. Goudy, Anthony Thornton, and John D. Caton are hereby appointed Commissioners to confer immediately with Congress and the President of the United States, and with the Legislatures and Executives of the several States, and urge the necessity of prompt action to secure said armistice, and the election of delegates to an early assembling of said convention, and to arrange and agree with the General Government and the several States upon the time and place of holding said convention, and that they report their action in the premises to the General Assembly of this State.

Resolved, That the Speaker of the House of Representatives be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to the President of the United States, to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and to each of the Governors and Speakers of the House of Representatives of the several States."

Lincoln's Battle With 'Doves'

By HENRY OWEN

The peace movement in the North during the Civil War reflected:

- An instinctive feeling that it was wrong to try to deal with a political problem (secession) by force of arms.
- Objections to the draft and, as the war continued, to heavy Union losses.
- Despair at the prospects of victory over what seemed to be not just any army, but an entire people.
- A growing feeling that peace and the Union could both be restored if Lincoln would only negotiate sensibly (i.e., if he would not insist on abolition of slavery).

The peace movement had two centers of strength, New York City and the Ohio-Indiana-Illinois area. It first showed major political strength in the 1862 Congressional elections, which went heavily against the administration in the mid-West.

Refused Funds for Troops

A Republican leader noted: "The people have furnished men and means in abundance for all purposes to conquer the enemy; but after a year and a half on trial . . . we have made no progress in putting down the rebellion . . . and the people are desirous of some change, they scarcely know what."

After this election, the Illinois House of Representatives passed an anti-war resolution by a large majority; and the Indiana legislature refused appropriations for raising troops. Gov. Yates dealt with the fractious Illinois legislature by the simple expedient of adjourning it until 1865; Gov. Morton kept Indiana in the war only by a barefaced dictatorship.

The 1863 elections generally favored pro-Union forces, but there was a startling development in Ohio.

Clement Vallandigham, who had been exiled for anti-war agitation, not only gained the Democratic nomination for Governor but won two-fifths of the votes cast in the general election.

This was the same man who, a short while before, had told his fellow Congressmen: "You have not conquered the South. You never will. It is not in the nature of things possible . . . Stop fighting. Make an armistice. Accept at once foreign mediation."

Newspapers Urged Peace

A month later, in December 1863, the United States House of Representatives tabled a resolution calling on the President to open

This Article

This is an essay in history, not current policy. These facts are interesting in their own right, not as a guide to what we should or shouldn't do today in wholly different circumstances.

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negotiations with the South. The vote was 98 to 59.

In the spring of 1864, as Grant's offensive against Richmond brought heavy losses, peace sentiment waxed.

Large peace meetings were held in major cities of the North.

The roster of American newspapers calling for peace included by now the New York Daily News, the New York Tribune (on-and-off), the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Columbus Crisis, the Detroit Free Press, the Indianapolis Sentinel, The Chicago Times, and many others.

In August 1864, the Chairman of National Republican Committee wrote Lincoln that "the tide is setting strongly against us . . . Were an election to be held now in Illinois we should be beaten . . . Pennsylvania is against us . . . Nothing but the most resolute action . . . can prevent the country from falling into hostile (i.e., Democratic) hands."

He attributed the party's misfortunes, in part, to the "widely diffused suspicion . . . that we can have peace with the Union if we would."

McClellan Nominated

He urged Lincoln to demonstrate the falseness of this view by appointing a peace commission to negotiate with Jefferson Davis, on only one condition: The supremacy of the Constitution be acknowledged.

Later that month, Lincoln recorded his belief that he would be defeated in the election, and that the new President would be unable to continue the war because of peace promises made during the election.

In early September, as if to bear out his prediction, the Democratic Party nominated Gen. McClellan for President on a platform, drafted under Vallandigham's leadership, which proclaimed that "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities . . . on the

basis of the Federal Union of States."

The peace movement had reached its peak.

Lincoln's Response

There were four main elements in Lincoln's response to this movement:

1. WAR AIMS. He sought to define the purposes of the war in terms of "an issue which had so great an emotional content that all the differences and uncertainties of the popular mind would be swallowed up in loyalty." (The quote is from Prof. Kirkland.)

That issue, Lincoln decided, was the survival of the Union and of representative government. This meant that the people of the Union should be able to settle their differences under the Constitution without, in Lincoln's words, "successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet."

This objective was set down in the Johnson-Crittenden resolution, which passed both houses of Congress by big majorities in 1861: "This war is not prosecuted upon our part in any spirit of aggression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution . . . and to preserve the Union . . . and as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

Chain of Reasoning

In his major addresses Lincoln returned again and again to this theme: That the war was being fought to ensure that "government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish from this earth." How could representative government succeed, he asked, if its judgments were to be overthrown by force of arms?

Thus, like Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, he related the conflict to timeless beliefs about the nature of man and government. And he did this not merely by rhetoric but by a chain of reasoning which the man in the street found clear and persuasive. (Indeed, Lincoln's straightforward arguments generally got a better reception from the public at large than from members of Congress.)

2. NEGOTIATIONS. Having defined his war aim, Lincoln wanted to show that it was Jefferson Davis, not he, who blocked peace on terms consistent with that aim.

To this end, he encouraged private probes of Confederate intentions, in 1863-64, by such enthusiastic "doves" as Horace Greeley, Col. Jacquess, and James Gilmore. He allowed them to travel to Canada and Richmond, in

order to discuss peace terms with Confederate representatives (including President Davis himself), and he promised to listen to their reports.

Lincoln made clear that the U.S. government would only enter negotiations if these emissaries could report that President Davis would agree, in such negotiations, to restore the Union and the Constitution. This was one issue on which Lincoln could not compromise without jeopardy to his essential war aim. By making this clear beforehand he reassured the "hawks" (Republican Radicals).

Pressed Abolition

The "hawks" also pressed him to make the abolition of slavery a pre-condition to peace. As the war went on, Lincoln had come increasingly to support abolition. Yet to make its immediate achievement a condition of peace would be to place in jeopardy the support for the war that he was getting from responsible "doves," the moderate Democrats.

The result: Masterful unclarity on Lincoln's part. In his famous "To Whom It May Concern" statement in mid-64 he cited two pre-conditions to peace: preservation of the Union, and abolition of slavery. When the Democrats protested that Lincoln was thus creating new obstacles to peace, he wrote private letters to peace leaders in the North, suggesting that if Jefferson Davis wanted to propose restoration of the Union without the abolition of slavery, "let him try me." The implication was that Lincoln might prove flexible on this point.

This vagueness pleased no one, but enabled the Greeley-Jacquess-Gilmore peace probes to be mounted without giving too much offense to either hawks or the doves.

Changed Tactics

These probes served the purpose Lincoln had in mind: They proved that the main obstacle to peace lay in Richmond, not Washington. President Davis indicated that the war could only be ended by accepting post-war Confederate rule in the South.

Lincoln encouraged disappointed peace probes to share these results with the Northern voters before the November election.

When that election was won, Lincoln changed his tactics, but not his strategy.

On Grant's urging, he accepted a Confederate invitation to talk peace at Hampton Roads with the Vice President of the Confederacy (an old friend) and two other Confederate Commissioners—without any prior indication of Confederate agreement to restore the Union. He wanted to discover

Doves' During the Civil War

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whether the deteriorating Southern military situation was reflected in a changed Confederate negotiating position. It was not.

The meeting, the only "official" negotiation of the war, broke up after four hours. The Confederate representatives could not agree to restore the Union, even though both Lincoln and Seward signalled some flexibility on abolition (at least in respect of means and timing). Lincoln could not agree to an armistice without a political settlement; this would only give the Southern armies needed respite, and prolong the war.

3. PACIFICATION. During this Conference the Southern Commissioners described Lincoln's demand that the South lay down its arms as a call for "unconditional submission." Seward replied that the people of the South would have the safeguards of the Constitution and the Courts, once the Union was restored.

Here was the essence of Lincoln's peacemaking. Confederate leaders might not give up the goal of overthrowing Union rule, but Lincoln hoped that the Southern people would, if they were offered a prospect of fair treatment in the Union.

His plans for pacification—restoring self-government and Congressional representation in occupied areas of the South—were to him a more likely road to peace than negotiation. He looked to settling the great issues that were at stake, not by negotiating under the threat of armed duress, but by submitting them to the normal process of free election. He hoped to restore peace by treating not with the Confederacy but with its citizens.

Insured Free Elections

All this took concrete form in the first Southern areas to come under Union rule: Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee. He sought quickly to restore state governments, and he instructed his military commanders to insure that there was a genuinely free vote. He did not want, he wrote one of them, "Northern men here (in the Congress) as representatives elected . . . at the point of the bayonet." Orderly elections were held as early as December 1862 in the First and Second Louisiana Congressional districts, which embraced New Orleans and outlying areas.

In December 1863 the President sought to dramatize what he was about. He announced that as soon as 10 percent of the registered voters in any state occupied by Union armies were ready to take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution, he would be prepared to restore state government. The people of that state could then

decide for themselves, in free elections, by whom they wanted to be governed—locally and in the Congress. With this went a sweeping amnesty.

The "hawks" disapproved and passed the punitive Wade-Davis law as a substitute. Lincoln used the pocket veto to kill that law.

Disappointed Crowd

He hoped that as word of his pacification policy got about, the morale of the Confederate people and armies would be affected and the way opened for a lasting peace.

All this was at the heart of Lincoln's concerns in the final months of his life. When a large crowd came to cheer beneath the White House windows at the news of Lee's surrender, Lincoln disappointed it: In this, his last speech, he spoke not of military victory but of his plans for restoring self-government on generous terms in the South—and of the progress which these plans were making in Louisiana.

Thus, Lincoln's handling of "negotiations" largely in terms of Northern politics was balanced by his handling of "pacification" largely in terms of Southern needs. The first he saw as a means of defusing peace sentiment in the North; the second was, in his view, the essence of peace-making in the South.

4. MAKING WAR. But none of this would avail, Lincoln believed, unless Union military successes convinced the Southern people that resistance was futile. "Peace" pressures on the President to relax the pace of military operations got short shrift.

This issue came to a head in the summer of 1864.

Grant's offensive against Richmond had bogged down in heavy casualties. A historian notes that "every day the North was sinking deeper in despair, as hopes of a speedy victory vanished." There were demands for firing "butcher" Grant and calling off his offensive.

Avoided Sherman

A stepped-up offensive would mean heavy losses and a new draft call, and would hurt Lincoln politically in the short run. On the other hand, if this offensive succeeded, fewer people would probably be killed in the long run, and the Northern peace party's position in the election would be weakened.

Some eminent Southerners were weighing the same factors. Gen. Stephen Ramseur of North Carolina wrote his wife: "If our armies can hold their own, suffer no crushing disaster before the next election, we may reasonably expect a termination of this war. . . . McClellan will be elected and

his election will bring peace. . . . Gen. Joseph Johnston, fighting ably in Georgia, sought to avoid pitched battle with Sherman—judging that a delaying defense was best calculated to enhance war weariness in the North. He and other Confederate Military leaders had long since ceased to think of victory; their only object was to keep the war going long enough to give peace sentiment in the North a chance to prevail.

Lincoln turned a deaf ear to pressures for "de-escalation." He called for another 500,000 men to be drafted (even though the draft was highly unpopular—witness the extensive draft riots in Ohio and New York the previous year.) He told the armies to press ahead, as hard as they could: "Hold on with a bulldog grip and chew and choke as much as possible."

Storm of Protest

A storm of protest broke about his head, as he knew it would. His biographer records: "All the submerged discontent broke into open clamor. The awful losses of the last few weeks had horrified the nation. The thought of further bloodshed brought revulsion."

The language with which some Northern newspapers greeted his demand for "five hundred thousand more victims" probably did not surprise Lincoln. His election prospects seemed to dip further.

But Lincoln's other expectations were also borne out: As Sherman and Grant pressed forward, Northern peace sentiment receded, Southern peace sentiment mounted, and McClellan's fortunes declined. After the November election, the Northern peace movement never troubled Lincoln again.

Lincoln's responses to the peace movement were effective and mutually reinforcing, because they were grounded in the principle of self-determination.

Based on Principle

Seeing the war largely as a means of preserving this principle, he was able to define its meaning eloquently and effectively.

Because he insisted that any peace negotiations be based on this principle, he was able to handle pressures for negotiation in a way that strengthened, rather than weakened, the war effort.

Because his pacification plans were directly related to this principle, they offered convincing hope for the future.

And because he perceived that this principle was at stake he was able—sensitive though he was to human suffering—to explain why pressures for abating a cruel war could not be accommodated.

Quoted Lincoln's Feelings About Peace Efforts

Numerous historians have commented on the failure of peace efforts which were made in 1864. How President Lincoln felt toward these efforts is revealed in the files of The Journal for that year. An interesting interview was reported by Judge John T. Mills, quoting President Lincoln as follows:

"Sir, the slightest knowledge of arithmetic will prove to any man that the rebel armies cannot be destroyed with Democratic strategy. It would sacrifice all the white men of the North to do it.

"There are now in the service of the United States nearly 200,000 able-bodied colored men, most of them under arms, defending and acquiring Union territory. The Democratic strategy demands that these forces be disbanded and that the masters be conciliated by restoring them to slavery. The black men who now assist Union prisoners to escape are to be converted into our enemies in the vain hope of gaining the good will of their masters. We shall have to fight two nations instead of one.

"Will you give our enemies such military advantages as will insure success, and then depend on coaxing, flattery and concession to get them back into the Union? Abandon all the posts now garrisoned by black men; take 200,000 men from our side and put them in the battle field or corn field against us, and we would be obliged to abandon the war in three weeks."



